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The WiretappingEavesdropping Problem:
A Professor's View
Yale Kamisar*
I. TAPs, LAws AND SOCIETY
[N]o doubt the cave-man looked back to the good old days when meii
were free to roam instead of being stuck in a damn hole in the ground.'

I hope that if we somehow manage to get past the bombs and the
missiles, future historians will be able to report that we, too,
marched forward with our faces turned backward. In the meantime, the more I think about The Eavesdroppers2 the better those
"old days" look. Even crouching in a dark hole has some advantages
over sitting in a glass house.
To illustrate:
One "private technician" has disclosed that between 1940 and
1956 he "bugged" five hundred residences -"from a tenement to a
mansion in Beverly Hills"-for California police officials. And apparently he is still going strong.' The files of a typical private tapper
in Chicago reveal that, even though one cautious "subject" moved
from one hotel room to another every day for four successive days,
he was unable to shake off electrical surveillance. Microphones were
secreted in each of the four rooms he occupied, and taps were
placed on each of the four phones he used."
We also learn from the book that unobtrusive vehicles "readily
mistaken for the kind of truck used by plumbers, painters and carpenters" may be fully equipped "to monitor and record conversa*Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School.
I am indebted to Dean William B. Lockhart and Professors John J. Cound and
Robert J. Levy of the University of Minnesota Law School for their valuable criticism
of the manuscript. I am also indebted to Charles H. Slayman, Jr., Chief Counsel
and Staff Director for the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the United
States Senate Committee on the judiciary, for providing me with much legislative
material before it became generally available.
1. MuLL~i,, THE UsEs OF THE PAsT 65 (1952).
2. DAsH, SCHWARTZ & KNOWLTON, THE EAVESDROPPERS (1959) [hereinafter cited
as DASH].
3. Id. at 188-89.
4. Id. at 228-29.
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tions being broadcast through tiny concealed transmitters." 5 We
learn, too, that those who plant hidden listening devices in the innermost places not infrequently appear in the guise of electrical repairmen, telephone company employees, or termite inspectors. 6
The outside and its dangers may have seemed terrible to the
cave-man, but at least he had three walls and a big stone to close
them off.' The "outside and its laws," 7 may become even more terrible to modern man because he cannot shut them out. He does not
have, or soon may not have, a place where "he can open his collar
.. . and give vent to his own particular daydreams, his mutterings
and snatches of crazy song, his bursts of obscenity and afflatus of
glory." 8
For whether or not Samuel Dash has penned a "thriller" in Part
I of The Eavesdroppers, "The Practice," as District Attorney Edward S. Silver charges, 9 Dash's colleague, Professor Richard F.
Schwartz, certainly seems to have written a "chiller" in Part II,
"The Tools."
At the outset, Professor Schwartz pooh-pahs "a tendency to regard electrical and electronic eavesdropping as a kind of black
magic,"' 0 but I find his treatment of "The Tools" all the more disturbing, all the more frightening, because it is a calm, conservative,
matter-of-fact treatment of the subject. Nowhere, it seems, is one
quite safe from the eavesdropper. Not in one's home or office or
automobile. Not even in one's bathroom with the shower turned on
The [wired] microphone itself may be hidden in the upholstery of a chair,
in a pot of flowers, or in a desk drawer. In addition, microphones may be

obtained through special suppliers which have all sorts of innocuous-looking housings, such as desk pads ....
Fine, almost invisible wires may be
used .

.

. under rugs, along baseboards, or even through walls....

5. Id. at 210.
6. Id. at 74-76, 185, 214-15, 283. In one case where a tap was put on the phone
of a hospital patient, the subject- thinking the tapper was a telephone employee-

even got out of bed to help install itl Id. at 214-15.
7. I have taken this phrase from CAm, THE SENSE

OF INJuSTncE 151 (1949).
8. Ibid. If I may be permitted to add a homely footnote to this eloquent passage,
I vividly recall the heated reaction of my company commander (who had been an
enlisted man for many years) when, brand new infantry second lieutenant that I
was, I entered the enlisted men's latrine, looking for a certain corporal. "Stay the
hell out of there," he snapped: "that's about the only place those 'poor bastards'
have to cuss out officers, to ridicule them, to brag about how they outsmarted them,
etc., and if they couldn't do that much they'd probably 'bust."'
Apparently some captains of industry are less sensitive. Thus, Dash has reported
elsewhere: "We learned . . . that some managers of plants were hiding microphones, in the men's rooms and ladies' rooms, to spy on their employees." Transcript
of The Big Ear, presented on "NBC Kaleidoscope," March 22, 1959, p. 21, copy on
file in University of Minnesota Law School Library [hereinafter cited as The Big
Ear].
9. Silver, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Prosecutor's View, 44
Mnq-. L. REv. 835 (1960).
10. DASH 805.
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Because of the small size, deceptive housings, and numerous types of
microphones available, it is difficult to guarantee any certain way of
detecting their presence..
It has been claimed that turning on a shower or creating some other sort
of noise helps to foil a planted microphone... . [But] the frequency
discrimination of some microphone structures might make the use of a
shower of no value, since the audio frequencies in this type of noise are
generally higher than those in the human voice."One investigator has reported building a wireless microphone circuit
into a flat surface by using transistors and printed circuits. Such a constructhe device [%inch thick] behind
tion enables the eavesdropper to plant
2
a picture on a wall or under a rug.'
A typical problem [with a "parabolic microphone," one type of highly
directive microphone] might be to try to eavesdrop on a conversation
taking place in an office on the opposite side of a hundred-foot-wide busy
street.... . [lt is perfectly possible that a conversation might be picked
up so as to be intelligible.
A second example of a possible use ...is in the eavesdropping on a
conversation in a restaurant or caf6 from, say, a darkened balcony in the
building. 3. . . [A] successful recording of the conversation could probably
be made.'
A small, continuously operating transmitter can be placed on an automobile under surveillance, perhaps beneath a fender. Its signal is picked
up by a receiver in another car or in a fixed plant. The use of two or more
fixed plants would allow well-known triangulation techniques to be
applied.' 4

Harold K. Lipset, who contributes the perspective and insights of
a leading private investigator to this symposium, tells us The Eavesdroppers "should serve a useful purpose in allaying fears of the almost supernatural." '5 I wonder. How "idle" are our fears when
Lipset himself reports that both "an ultra-miniature wireless microphone, powered by atomic batteries and no larger than the eraser
on a lead pencil" and "a complete recorder . . . built into a cigarette lighter" are "on the brink of reality"?' 6
The potentialities are almost infinite. Thus a fonner Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor recently dwelt on the possi-

bilities of putting a listening device in someone else's suit:
[Y]ou could sew into it a very flexible, black, thin-looking thing - a man
would not be aware of. This, for example, could be the transmitting
antenna and this could be shaped and sewed into the shoulder on a suit
11. Id. at 341--4.
12. Id. at 343-44.
13. Id. at 350-51. (Emphasis added.)
14. Id. at 379.
15. Lipset, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Private Investigator's
View, 44 MnN. L. REv. 873 (1960).
16. Id. at 888.
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and the thread for radiating could be put up there. ... And if the man
were to wear this suit you could hear him . . . up to a thousand feetand you'd hear anything he said while wearing
this suit. And we would say
7
the batteries might last for a month's time.'

What solace is there in the knowledge that these devices are "the
natural outgrowth of technological advancement"? 18 How does the
fact that "there is nothing mysterious about the equipment itself or
the methods employed" 19 make wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping less fearsome? After all, there isn't anything really mysterious or supernatural about the hydrogen bomb or the intercontinental missile either, is there? If anything, doesn't the fact that the
relevant principles and methods are knowable and explicable make
the electronic equipment -or the bomb or missile for that matter
-more awesome?
"Every new idea, every scientific discovery, every invention," it
has been observed, "throws a burden on government-some of
them tremendous burdens. Thus it is that the lawyer is primarily
charged with keeping government attuned to all the other activities
of the social order. . . . Every institution, every activity, must have
its legal counterpart." 20 What, then, has the law done about wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping?
One soon discovers that while the eavesdropping problem, that is,
electronic threats to privacy other than wiretapping, is "far newer
and far graver than the wiretapping problem . . . the law relating
to eavesdropping is even more chaotic and outdated than the law
of wiretapping." 2 ' I think there are strong policy reasons for permitting some law enforcement tapping and, as I shall dwell on
later, that such authorization would violate neither the letter nor
the spirit of the fourth amendment. I cannot say the same for electronic eavesdropping. As Edward Bennett Williams has observed,
not only does electronic eavesdropping loom as "the ultimate invasion of privacy," 22 but conceptually its employment by the police is
less justifiable than tapping.23 For the reasons he presents2 4 I think
electronic eavesdropping should be outlawed altogether.25
17. Dr. Leo Beranek The Big Ear 34-35.
18. Lipset, supra note 15, at 885.
19. Id. at Ibid.
20. Leon Green, in My PmLosopny oF LAw 129, 137-38 (1941).
21. Williams, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Defense Counse's
View, 44 MiNN. L. REv. 855, 862 (1960).
22. Id. at 866.
23. Id. at 864.
24. Id. at 862-68.
25. Even with Olmstead on the books, and even though the Communications Act
of 1934 is inapplicable to non-telephonic conversations, I think the Supreme Court,
by invoking the fourth amendment, and by exercising its supervisory power over the
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As conspicuous as is the failure to distinguish between tapping
and other forms of electronic eavesdropping and to focus on the
greater dangers to privacy posed by the latter practices, this is still
not the most salient feature of the "law" on the subject-that is,
if one defines "law" broadly enough. Thus, despite Professor Robert
Knowlton's incisive analysis of the applicable judicial pronouncements and legislative materials in Part III of The Eavesdroppers,I
for one would regard Part I, "The Practice" more deserving of the
title "The Law" than Part II,which actually bears that title. In
any event, one of the few things clear about the 'law" in this difficult and complex area is the sfriking divergence between the lawon-the books and the law-in-action. Many law enforcement officers
in the "permissive jurisdiction" of New York are said to be doing
a good deal more than is permitted; 26 many in the "prohibition ju-

risdictions" of California and Illinois are quite uninbited as a
matter of fact:
[Los Angeles Police Chief] Parker believes that a police officer is a fool if
he violates the wiretapping law. Parker says, however, that he knows that
every federal agency in Los Angeles is wiretapping. He says that all state
agencies, .including the attorney generals office, are wiretapping ....27
The wiretapping equipment of Scotland Yard [the popular name for the
Chicago intelligence unit] was always in use. There were at least ten to
twelve constant wiretaps going every day. In almost every major investigaunit conducted, wiretapping was employed in one way or antion the
28
other.
Scotland Yard police are not eager to have any attempt made to have
the legislature legalize wiretapping. They say that even if wiretapping is
illegal, they are going to tap anyhow, and therefore can't see any reason
to make it legal. Raising the question in the legislature, they believe,
29
would only stir up controversy ....

The Eavesdroppersmust come as no surprise to Gunnar Myrdal

and his staff of sociologists:
[W]e find that this American, who is so proud to announce that he will
not obey laws other than those which are "good" and "just," as soon as the
discussion turns to something which in his opinion is bad and unjust, will
" To
emphatically pronounce that "there ought to be a law against [it]. ....
administration of federal justice, can exclude the fruits of federal law enforcement
electronic eavesdropping conducted without the consent of a party to the conversation . See Part m.-C.-( 2) infra. On the other hand, much state and private electronic
eavesdropping may be beyond the reach of federal legislation. See Williams, supra
note 21, at 867.
26. See the discussion of findings by Dash and others in Hennings, The Wiretapping-EavesdroppingProblem: A Legislator's View, 44 MmN. L. REv. 813, 819-20.

(1960).

27. DAsH 173.
28. Id. at 219
29. Id. at 221-22.
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demand and legislate all sorts of laws against this or that is just as much
part of American freedom as to disobey the laws when they are enacted.
America has become a country where exceedingly much is permitted in
practice but at the same time exceedingly much is forbidden in law.3 0

Dash's findings must be even less surprising to jurists such as Thurman Arnold. What Arnold said a generation ago about some of the
criminal laws directed at private citizens may, I am afraid, be just
as true today of some of the laws aimed at public officials:
Most unenforced criminal laws survive in order to satisfy moral objections

to established modes of conduct. They are unenforced because we want to
continue our conduct, and unrepealed because we want to preserve our
morals. 31

II. THE ENDs AND

H MEANS

Those who seek to legalize law enforcement tapping or eavesdropping soon find that they are "toiling uphill against that heaviest
of all argumentative weights- the weight of a slogan." 32 They are

charged with advocating "dirty business, 33 with ivoking the "pernicious," 34 "odius" or "amoral" 3 6 doctrine, as various judges in
tapping or eavesdropping cases have called it, that the end justifies
the means.3

7

The end-does-not-justify-the-means resistance to legislative change
30. MxnnAL, AN AmEmcAN DuAa
17 (1944).
31. ABNoLD, THE SYMBOLSoF ,oRNmmNr 160 (1935).
32. BLACx, THE PEOPLE AD THE COuRT 88 (1960).
33. Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
470 (1928).
34. Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
485 (1928).
35. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747,
758 (1952).
36. Judge Hofstadter, denying an application for an order permitting New York
police to tap, Matter of Interception of Telephone Communications of Anonymous,
207 Misc. 69, 73, 136 N.Y.S.2d 612, 616 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
37. It is interesting to note that while some of the most vigorous proponents of
law enforcement tapping are troubled by this argument, see, e.g., PAnxal, POLiCE
111-12 (Wilson ed. 1957) ("We are not arguing that the end justifies the means;
on the contrary, we argue that the means are neutral.
...
), some of the most
eloquent defenders of the present ban concede there may be situations where the
end does justify reprehensible means, tapping or otherwise. Thus, while Professor
Helen Silving observes that "government itself being a means and not a Leviathan
engulfing its subjects, its choice of means is most significant" and takes the view
that "a government which . . . taps wires, or eavesdrops has lost its moral right to
punish," she goes on to say that "where there is impending danger of a serious evil
that cannot be averted except by use of wiretapping or eavesdropping, the ordinary
rules of criminal law on 'necessity' afford ample grounds for resort to such remedies,
notwithstanding their inherently criminal nature." Hearings before the Subcommittee
on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 3, at 677-78, 684 (1959) [hereinafter cited as 1959 Hearings]. Of
course, most proponents of legalized tapping claim just such a "necessity."
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in this area rests on the notion that even if tapping were not banned
by positive law,38 such activity would still be, for example, "ignoble,"
"immoral," "unethical," and-no end can make it otherwise I must
confess I don't see why not. I recall the observation that a wise
Frenchman is supposed to have made to the effect that "we need
39 not
throw to the dogs all that is not fit for the altar of the gods."
Did not he who coined the "dirty business" phrase also remind us
that many, indeed, are the occasions when we do, we should, and
we must, engage in just such business?
If conscripts are necessary for its army, it [society] seizes them, and
marches them, with bayonets in their rear, to death. It runs highways and
railroads through old family places in spite of the owner's protest. ... 40

Opponents of legalized tapping, any legalized tapping, might well
retort that in the administration of the criminal law, at least, the
end should not justify the means. Then, may I ask, what about the
88. Certainly the dissents of Justices Holmes and Brandeis in Olmstead may be
reasonably construed as condemning only resort to governmental methods which
constitute specific violations of the criminal law. Thus, Holmes wrote, 277 U.S. at
469-70:
I think, as Mr. Justice Brandeis says, that apart from the Constitution the
Government ought not to use evidence obtained and only obtainable by a criminal act. . . . It also is desirable that the Government should not itself foster
and pay for other crimes, when they are the means by which the evidence is to
be obtained .....
[I]t makes no difference that in this case wire tapping is made a crime by the
law of the State, not by the law of the United States. ... The reason for excluding evidence obtained by violating the Constitution seems to me logically to
lead to excluding evidence obtained by a crime of the officers of the law.
And Brandeis wrote, id. at 485:
If the Government becomes a law-breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites
every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in
the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare
that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a
private criminal-would bring terrible retribution.
If this is all the Olmstead dissenters meant, proponents of new legislation have
no quarrel with them; this is why they seek legislation. See Silver, supra note 9, at
852-53. To meet the contention that law enforcement tapping ought no longer to be a
crime on the ground that it is a crime and officers of the law should not commit
crimes is, to put it kindly, to miss the whole point.
However, there is reason to think that Mr. justice Brandeis, at least, meant more:
That the wire-tapping decision shocked Brandeis deeply is indicated by the
fact that he broke his generally observed rule not to discuss Court affairs informally. When questioned about the case in 1931 he said [to his niece]: "One
can never be sure of ends - political, social, economic. There must always be
doubt and difference of opinion; one can be 51 per cent sure." There is not the
same margin of doubts as to means. Here "fundamentals do not change; centuries of thought have established standards. Lying and sneaking are always
bad, no matter what the ends."
MAsox, BuN.mDs: A Fm MA's LiFE 569 (1946).
89. M. R. CoHEN, THE FArrm OF A LIBEiAr. 7 (1946).

40. HoL ms, Tim

COMMON

LAw 43 (1881).
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How else do most of us justify the imposition of
criminal law itself.
41
punishment?
To say that the end never justifies reprehensible means is to brush
off as invalid per se the contention that law enforcement tapping
can find justification in the need to meet the growing dangers posed
by modem crime. Why then, how then, is it so easy to defend the
prohibition against tapping-said to significantly reduce society's
ability to detect crime and apprehend criminals- on the ground
that the ban is needed to ward off totalitarianism?
All right, wiretapping is a "dirty business." What do you call
allowing the criminal a greater measure of safety and freedom than
might otherwise be the case? a sporting gesture? How do you regard throwing out narcotic or labor racket or even gambling convictions? esthetically pleasing? What else is the case against wiretapping but an application of the doctrine that the end, call it "liberty" or "freedom," "privacy" or "individuality," does justify the
means? "The fervently repeated American cold-war formula that the
end does not justify the means," an astute commentator on the contemporary scene has pointed out, "tends to become more than a
wholly proper critique of Soviet ruthlessness: it encourages us to
forget that we do need ends, precisely to justify, and criticize, our
means." 42

Suffice to say that both sides must find and can find comfort in
the thought that one of the many ways in which "man differs from
other animals ...is that he is willing to engage in activities that
are unpleasant in themselves, because they are means to ends that
he desires." 43
I am not unimpressed by the case against wiretapping; I am only
unimpressed by the a priori arguments. It seems to me that those
who say that the wiretapping ban should stand because the end
does not and cannot justify the means and stop right there are not
unlike those who embrace the immutable principles of "natural law."
Both groups can claim the sanction of ultimate principles for their
legal conclusions and thus make most reassuring and high-sounding
pronouncements. The trouble is these claims also permit them to
avoid the need to furnish specific support for their conclusions or
41. Since punishment consists in the infliction of pain it is, apart from its consequences, an evil; consequently, it is good and, therefore, just only if and to the
degree that it serves the common good by advancing the welfare of the person
punished or of the rest of the population. This is the position taken by Plato,
Aristotle, Cicero, St. Thomas Aquinas, and the medieval church, as well as by
Hobbes, Beccaria, Bentham, and many others in more modem times.
LAw AND rrs ADmqISTRATION 9-10 (1940).
MICHAEL & WEcHsLER, CIMIHNaN.
42. Rms -A, FAcEs iN = CnowD 48 (1952).
AND mn IND~vmuA. 37 (1949).
43. RussELI, Aumor
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to submit 4them
to the uncertain process of examination and analysis
4
by others.
I do not claim that the ends put forth by law enforcement people
do justify tapping or electronic eavesdropping. I simply contend one
cannot say they do not without doing a good deal more than wineing, however hard, at the means employed. Without considering,
for example: How desirable are the ends said to justify these practices? How likely it is that the unpleasant means will achieve these
ends? How essential is it to employ these means, as opposed to less
unpleasant alternatives?
After all, it was a "liberal," however we define that emotive term,
who observed:
Rigorous and unqualified obedience to the accepted ethical rules is generally admired as a virtue, but it really ought to be viewed as involving
an obtuse insensibility to the rich and subtle variety of human relations.
The rules of ethics certainly have no securer scientific basis than the rules
of hygiene have. Both sets are undoubtedly useful as general maxims. But
only quacks rely on such maxims without further knowledge of the actual
circumstances surrounding concrete cases.4 5

Opponents of wiretapping do not, of course, rest their case on
slogans alone. 46 But once we get past the slogans and look at the
particulars, the problem is not nearly so simple. For example, I had
long sided with tapping opponents on one of the most sharply disputed issues of the debate- the effectiveness of wiretapping as a
crime combatting measure. 4r I had long assumed that the underworld must be so well "educated" against the use of the phone that
invasions of privacy caused by tapping easily outweighed the small
gains, if any, to law enforcement. However, while Dash's findings
generally furnish little comfort to proponents of wiretapping, 48 on
this particular issue he lends them much support:
I believe as a result of our investigation in New York, our facts will
refute the statement that wiretapping is not useful; that wiretapping does
not obtain law enforcement success. There is no doubt about it, that people
who commit crimes, especially those acting in an organized criminal manner in the rackets, gambling rackets and vice, talk on the telephone. These
include the most sophisticated criminal. After hearing, say, District Attorney Hogan testify before the Celler committee, that his office wiretaps,
the next day, a sophisticated hoodlum might well talk on the phone and
44. See Loevinger, Dogmatism and Skepticism in Law, 38 MiNN. L. REv. 191,
203-04 (1954).
45. M. R. CoumN, op. cit. supranote 39, at 82.
46. For a number of powerful arguments against law enforcement wiretapping, see,
e.g., Hennings, supra note 26; Schwartz, On Current Proposals to Legalize Wiretapping, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 157 (1954); Williams, supra note 21.
47. See, e.g., the discussion in Hennings, supra note 26, at 822-24.
48. See, e.g., Silver, supra note 9, passim.
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give incriminating evidence. Apparently, we have grown up using the
telephone and don't know how to talk without it....
Strangely enough, although many of these people began conversations
with, "Be careful, the phone is tapped," or "Don't say anything," within
a minute or two the kitchen sink comes in. Apparently, they have not been
able to use the kind of codes. They do try it sometimes. We have found
that elaborate codes have been set up so that the person listening wouldn't
understand what they are saying, but very often the people who participate in these types of crimes are not very intelligent. They forget the code.
They can't understand and
after a while they give the whole thing up and
49
talk as freely as they can.

Not only is talk of "means" versus "end" unhelpful-it is even

misleading. The "end" cannot be cleanly and neatly torn from the
49. 1959 Hearingspt. 3, at 513-14. The point is made in more summary fashion in
DAsH at 37. See also Silver, supra note 9, at 845, for an account of how law enforcement officers gain "cumulative information" by tapping. The effectiveness of governmental tapping is illustrated throughout THE EAvE~snaoPPERs. See, e.g., pp. 37-38,
167-68, 200.

It is interesting to note that while St. Louis prosecutor Thomas F. Eagleton is
opposed to law enforcement tapping-at a nationwide meeting of county and

prosecuting attorneys only he and one other voiced disapproval of legalized tapping he does not dispute its usefulness as a weapon against crime:
On that score- on unadulterated practicality

-the

advocates of governmental

wiretapping must prevail. There is nothing more practical than listening into a
conversation between two narcotic peddlers. There is nothing more practical
than tapping the line of an extortionist mercilessly bleeding his prey. ....
The district attorneys of this Nation can make an impressive case in support
of wiretapping by detailing to you the dozens of cases they have cracked by
use of wiretap- without which such cases could not have been made. In their
recital of these events, they are unquestionably sincere....
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 259 (1958) [hereinafter cited as
1958 Hearings].
Further support for the view that law enforcement tapping is, or at least can be,
a potent force against crime comes from across the Atlantic:
[W]ith regard to the present day uses of interception, we received conclusive

evidence of their effectiveness. We were told of many major wrong-doers who
had been brought to justice, and of the frustration of espionage....
Between 1958 and 1956 the number of arrests made by the Metropolitan Police
of important and dangerous criminals as the result of direct interception was
57 per cent of the number of telephone lines tapped ....
So far in 1957 every
interception but one has led to an arrest. . . . The number of cases of detection
of major Customs frauds directly or indirectly due to interceptions of mail and
telephone lines was 80 per cent. of the number of interceptions ....
Account
should also be taken of the removal from the field of highly skilled operators
and the deterrent effect upon others. The sums lost to the reserves and to the
revenues might otherwise have reached considerably greater proportions ...
It was emphasised in the evidence given to us that the use of methods of interception is strictly limited to the biggest and most dangerous offenders and that
on the whole the most important captures and seizures are made as the result
of interception.
BEPORT OF THE COM

ME

OF PRIVY COUNCILLORS APPonrED TO INQUIRE INTO THE

nrETcEPTION OF CONONICATIONS,

paras. 107, 110-12 (1957), reprinted in appen-

dix to 1958 Hearings,pt. 2, at 459, 480-81.
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"means" and placed alongside it for purposes of comparison. For
"wedo not really understand our 'ends' until we have considered the
probable consequences of carrying them out in practice, and this
we cannot do without knowing the means available for this purpose." 50 In this sense, in a very real sense, "the means are part of
the end.""
If this is what opponents of wiretapping-electronic eavesdropping
mean, I have no quarrel with them. To maintain that the end can,
and often does, justify the means is not to deny that "the means can
produce their own set of 2evils that are as repressive as those which
one sets out to remedy." 5

When we realize that the by-products of a law may be as relevant
to its valuation as its assumed purpose, when we accept the view
that "what law does is part, and the most important part, of what
law is,"53 more than one law seems to be worthy only of repeal.54
Is legalized law enforcement tapping such a law? Quite possibly, if
Dash's findings are accepted. For whether or not such laws do
achieve the designed ends of greater crime prevention, detection,
and apprehension, they do seem to bring about certain undesirable
consequences. They seem, for instance, to greatly facilitate and
enhance police bribery and corruption. Two examples should suffice:
Julius Helfand, then the assistant district attorney in charge of the [Kings
County (Brooklyn)] Grand Jury investigation, reported there were many
instances of illegal wiretaps which were installed by members of the
plainclothes division. He said that these wiretaps were made without court
orders and were installed not for the purpose of apprehending bookmakers, but for the purpose of obtaining information as to the extent of the
business the bookmakers were doing. This information was passed on to
50. Walter Wheeler Cook, in Mv Pmrrosopay OF LA W 60-61 (1941) (discussing
"the key" to John Dewey's "empirical theory of the evaluation of values").
51. Id. at 61. Or as Gandhi once put it: "The means may be likened to a seed, the
end to a tree; and there is just the same inviolable connection between the means and
the end as there is between the seed and the tree." Quoted by Mr. Justice Douglas,
in W. THE JtnxEs 354 (1956).
52. Douglas, The Means and the End, 1959 WASr. U.L.Q. 103, 104 (1959).
53. F. S. CoHEN, ErmcAL SYsTmS Aism LEGAL IDEALs 51 (1933).
54. See, e.g., Allen, The Borderlandof the CriminalLaw: Problems of "Socializing"
Criminal Justice, 32 Soc. SEV.REv. 107, 111-12 (1958):
Every American criminal code identifies, as eligible for penal treatment, persons who indulge in certain types of conduct that might better be left to the
exclusive concern of medicine, psychiatry, or the general moral sense of the community. Consider, for example, the matter of voluntary homosexual relations
between adult participants .... If the objective of such laws is to prevent
homosexual behavior, they have surely failed in their purpose. But these laws
have other consequences, few of them desirable. One need not be overly sophisticated to understand that the most tangible result of this legislation is to place
in the hands of unscrupulous police officers and others an instrument of blackmail through which money and property may be extorted from the homosexual
under threat of exposure and prosecution.
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other plainclothesmen who covered the areas being tapped. The bookmakers were approached by these plainclothesmen and shaken down for
sums of money commensurate with the business they were doing. Regular
payments were required thereafter if the bookmaker wanted to continue
to operate. A constant check on a bookmaker's telephones informed the
plainclothesmen when their price should go up or down, depending on the
fortunes of the bookmaker.
Some of these wiretaps, Helfand reported, were authorized by a court
order. The affidavit would contain information sufficient to satisfy the
New York law and the judge, but the facts would be untrue. The fraudulent applications were used to obtain authority for wiretapping to aid the
plainclothesmen in coercing illegal and corrupt payments from gamblers. 55
The performance of the New Orleans Police Department has been
reported to be exceptionally poor in the area where wiretapping is most
employed by other police departments - organized racketeering ...
The New Orleans crime investigating committee charged that the New
Orleans Police Department did not do a good job of law enforcement
against organized crime, but, on the contrary, was permeated with corruption and was protecting organized criminal activity, rather than serving
as a force against it.
[TIhese illegally operated establishments [for maintaining handbooks,
poker games and prostitution] exist with the New Orleans police alternatively encouraging and harrassingthem while sharing in their profits. 6

The magnitude of the problem may be seen from the fact that
the great bulk of law enforcement tapping is done in gambling and
prostitution cases.57 I do not take lightly the point forcefully made
by so experienced and so respected a district attorney as Edward
S. Silver that "gambling is the very heartbeat of organized crime," 1s
but does this not make so much the worse the police bribery and
extortion in this area reported by Dash?
Another undesirable consequence of legalized law enforcement
tapping or eavesdropping is that it seems to more or less immunize
similar practices by private detectives as well. At the very least, the

intimate relationship between public and private tappers and eaves-

droppers reported by Dash is hardly conducive to zealous enforcement of criminal sanctions against the latter. Thus:

Private tappers in New York have sold equipment they themselves
manufactured to the police department and district attorney's office.5 9 The sheriff's office in Baton Rouge, though lightly equipped,
55. DASH 55-56. See also the extensive interview with a former New York plainclothesman, id. at 57-62, reprinted in large part in Silver, supra note 9, at 841-42. But
see Silver's accompanying discussion.
56. DASH 124-125.

57. E.g., id. at 66, 152, 280.
58. Silver, supra note 9, at 843.
59. DA sH 82.
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makes extensive use of wiretapping, relying "almost wholly on the
services of a private detective for its ...needs"; 6 0 the latter also
conducts "a brisk private practice." 6 Fearful of a legislative crackdown, Massachusetts law enforcement agencies only keep a meager
supply of eavesdropping equipment on hand, calling regularly on
the good offices of a more generously endowed "private New York
wiretapping specialist." 62
Although a general ban against tapping has long existed in Cali63
fornia, police have interpreted a recent decision, People v. Malotte,
to permit tapping with the subscriber's permission, even though the
parties to a particular conversation may not include the subscriber.64
For the purpose of installing bugs and wiretaps deemed legalized by
Malotte, the district attorney's office in San Francisco has found it
necessary to employ the city's "busiest electrical eavesdropper," as
have California police agencies outside the San Francisco area, but
his "principal work" still consists of private cases referred to him
by lawyers.6 5 No doubt these practices help to account for "perhaps
the most astonishing fact about private eavesdropping in the face
of California's criminal sanctions"the open, boastful, and almost cavalier manner in which this private eavesdropping is done. Under the heading of "Detectives" in the classified section of the Los Angeles telephone directory appears a listing of sixty
to seventy private detectives or private detective agencies. A large number of the private detectives promise in their listings to supply the latest
in electronic surveillance. "Secret recordings" and "Complete line of
modem electronic surveillance" are blatantly advertised. In one large
advertisement, where secret recordings and electronic surveillance are
promised, the private detective, in order that his meaning may strike
home, supplies two drawings depicting this clandestine activity, one
showing a figure with earphones connected to a telephone and another
60. Id. at 135-36.
61. Id. at 139.
62. Id. at 153. Home grown private tappers are lightly regarded by all concerned
in Massachusetts. Id. at 155.
63. 46 Cal. 2d 59, 292 P.2d 517 (1956) (admitting evidence of a phone conversa-

tion between defendant and a police officer defendant thought was one of her
"customers"). It seems quite clear that Malotte is limited to situations where a party
to the particular conversation has consented to the tap. For the contention that defendant's protection against unreasonable search and seizure was violated was
rejected on the ground that "when a person discusses the commission of a crime
with another ... there is no unreasonable invasion of privacy when the other uses
the conversation against him." Id. at 63, 292 P.2d at 519. The argument that a

violation of section 640 of the California Penal Code had occurred was similarly
disposed of: 'There is no learning of the contents of a communication 'fraudulently, clandestinely, or in any other unauthorized manner' when one of the participants to the conversation consents to or directs its overhearing or preservation." Id.
at 64, 292 P.2d at 520.
64. D. sn 171.
65. Id. at 213.
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showing a detective with earphones connected to a contact microphone
attached to a wall.66

Until the summer of 1957, at least, when legislation was enacted
banning all tapping in Pennsylvania, the shoe was on the other foot
in Philadelphia. Here, evidently, the law enforcement eavesdroppers, not the private variety, have had the edge in know-how, equipment, and connections with former and present telephone company
employees. Thus, according to Dash, "about a dozen Philadelphia
police officers did private wiretapping for extra money. They worked
for lawyers, labor unions, security chiefs in business houses, and
private detectives." or The files of one private detective led to the
disclosure that his electronics "expert" in domestic relations
cases
68
was a "popular police captain" who charged $200 per job.

But the view that the means are part of the end, that what a law
does bears most significantly on what a law is, cuts two ways. In
our haste to demonstrate that laws permitting some wiretapping
can be and have been much abused, let us not forget that laws
forbidding any tapping can be and have been more or less completely disregarded. Indeed, one who reads The Eavesdroppers is
tempted to slam the book shut, raise it high over his head, and
shout: Scorecard! Get your scorecardl You can't tell a "prohibition"
66. Id. at 208-09. Consider also the TV-sales talk from "Harvey's Radio," an audio
equipment store in the Times Square area described by reporter Chet Huntley as "a
good place to buy hi-fi components, amateur radio gear and devices which record
in secret":
Here's another device. I see you have a tie on. . . . [T]his just slips across the
tie - and you'll see it just like that - that's all you would see. The rest would go
through your shirt and then up to the harness package. . . .Whatever I hear
the microphone would hear, no matter where I am. And you can admit, it's
rather inconspicuous. A microphone like this would run around thirty-five dollars. ... This is a microphone... . the type of thing that could fit under a
ledge, anywhere - could fit inside of a concealed blotter - on top of a desk....
I would like to show you one more - something that's rather new. It's called the
Edward's Recorder. Its the smallest thing known -at least the smallest that
we've ever seen. Isn't that something? It weighs under a pound .... Now, this
type of microphone, you can envision, is certainly going to be no problem to
hide. It has one different advantage over the others. These two cells that you
see here are set up to record stereophonically .... Here's two cells. Say that
you're travelling - you're in a hotel or you're in someone's apartment where, for
some reason or another, you want to record right off the phone. We know if you
break into the ph6ne -well, you don't break into phones -you take this little
wafer - put this right under the ring-box ... that device will pick up the
whole conversation- both sides- with no touching of wires. And then I've got
something very special for the businessman - so to say. The businessman is anybody who works for a living, in a sense....
The Big Ear 24-26.
67. Id. at 265.
68. Id. at 258. Dash points out that "the statements of the private detective and of
the police captain admitting this practice were received by the police department,
but no disciplinary action was taken." Ibid.
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from a "permissive" or a "virgin" one without a scorejurisdiction
69
card1
To illustrate:
While California has prohibited law enforcement officers from
tapping phones since 1905, "wiretapping is used constantly" by San
Francisco police; "a number of taps are operating every day." 70 Law
enforcement tappingis done only for the purpose of aiding investigation and never for the
purpose of collecting evidence. The statute prohibiting wiretapping, of
course, makes this policy necessary. However, police say that even if they
were allowed to use wiretapping evidence, they would prefer not to do
so, but to use their wiretapping only to obtain leads. 71

Illinois has had an outright ban against tapping since 1927, but
the intelligence unit in the Chicago police department has "at least

ten to twelve constant wiretaps going every day" and has employed
wiretapping "in almost every major investigation" it has conducted. 72
Again, "of course, information obtained through wiretapping was
never used in evidence" but only "as an investigative aid and for
leads." 7
On the other hand, while a Louisiana statute has long furnished
"the broadest authorization for law enforcement wiretapping existing in this country," 7 4 wiretapping is also used only as an aid to
investigation and never for the purpose of introducing what is
obtained into evidence. 5 While such evidence is admissible in
Louisiana courts, state law enforcement agencies, as Dash quaintly
puts it, "are operating under strict instructions from the telephone
company." 76 Similarly, while prior to the summer of 1957 Nevada
69. "Prohibition" jurisdictions are those where wiretapping, including the law
enforcement variety, is outlawed; Dash treats two, California and Illinois. 'Permissive" jurisdictions covered are New York (by court order), Massachusetts (with the
written permission of the district attorney or the attorney general), Louisiana (law
enforcement tapping subject to no controls at all). The "virgin" jurisdictions of
Nevada and Pennsylvania surveyed by Dash had no legislation dealing with the
subject at the time of the study-an absence of law which enforcement agencies
interpreted to mean freedom for police tapping. Legislation on the subject was
passed in both states during the summer of 1957. Enforcement tapping was banned
in Pennsylvania and made subject to court order in Nevada.
70. DAS 165. That is, tapping not legalized by the Malotte decision.
71. Ibid.
72. Id. at 219.
73. Ibid.

74. Id. at 120. Since 1928, Louisiana law enforcement officers have been authorized
by state law to tap for the "purpose of obtaining information to detect crime" subject
to no controls.
75. Id. at 122-23, 129.
76. Id. at 122.
In return for the considerable help the telephone company gives the police,
which makes police wiretapping easy, the telephone company expects that the
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police had "complete license" for tapping, and the Nevada courts do
not exclude even illegally seized evidence, police tapping, as a matter of internal law enforcement policy, at least in Las Vegas, "has
never been used for the purpose of obtaining evidence, but solely
as an aid in investigation.""
One can say much more forcefully about the absolute bans against
tapping what Mr. Justice Frankfurter said, forcefully enough, of
the M'Naghten Rules. They are "very difficult for conscientious
people and not difficult enough" for others; "they are in large measure abandoned in practice, and therefore .. .in large measure
shams." 78 1 do not know whether or not the police will ever become
content with or can ever be made to conform to the limits prescribed
by court-order wiretap legislation. But I think I do know that they
will not- and cannot be made to -live with a total ban.
III. WHAT WAS LosT IN Olmstead?

A labor lawyer has suggested that his brethren "sometimes conduct with great skill what may in fact be sham battles, battles in
which the event is of no real importance, or even battles in which,
if they were more aware of the real character of the outcome, they
might be on the other side. I think the continuing discussion over
whether wiretapping should have been or ought to be held subject
to the requirements of the fourth amendment well illustrates that
other lawyers are not immune from the same criticism.
A. What if the FourthAmendment Applied to Tapping?
For example, a recent commentator has complained thatone of the greatest handicaps in the debates today concerning wiretapping
is the lack of a solid, firm legal basis upon which to formulate a comprehensive solution to the problemis in this field, a base which Fourth Amendment rights and administrative provisions respecting searches and seizures
would have provided. This is not to intimate that a legislative solution
cannot be reached but Olmstead by its failure of vision has made the
task infinitely more difficult.80

As the same commentator takes pains to point out elsewhere, how81
ever, his objection to the holding in United States v. Olmstead,
police will use the wiretaps only as leads and not for evidence in court and,
above all, the police must not reveal that they are wiretapping. This secrecy,
the company feels, is necessary to preserve public confidence in the telephone.
Ibid.
77. Id. at 278.
78. FauNxFtmTER, The Problem of Capital Punishment, in OF L w

AND

MEN 77,

97 (Elman ed 1956) (1950 testimony before Royal Commission on Capital Punishment).
79. Hays, Foreword to Labor Law Symposium, 59 CoLum. L. REv. 1, 5 (1959).
80. BmSEL, CONTROL OvER ILLEGAL ENFoRcEmmNT Or Tm CRmmqA LAw: Roixn
or Tm SuPRn m COURT

36 (1955).

81. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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that wiretapping is neither a "search" nor a "seizure" is "not founded
on the belief that all wiretapping should be abolished but that it
of the search
should be brought within the administrative process
82
warrant as provided in the Fourth Amendment."
I fail to see how reliance on the serpent-windings of the many
search and seizure rules which have plagued the courts for decades
promises either solidity or firmness. And if we are to fall back on
the search and seizure warrant, why not also on the precarious
weighing of values characterizing the recurring problem of when
officers can search without a warrant? Drawing upon search and
seizure cases to ascertain when taps can be made without a court
order should be good for one or more bitterly contested 5-4 decisions
per year.
So long as it is accepted that a contrary decision would not have
banned all tapping, it is not easy to see how the Olmstead case
might have offered a solid basis for controlling wiretap abuses. It is
even more difficult to see how it can be said, long after section 605
of the Federal Communications Act was construed in the Nardone
cases8 3 to place a total ban on tapping, that Olmstead "disabled"
the Supreme Court from effectively handling the problems4 or dealt
"a crippling blow to judicial administration in the field of civil
liberties." 5 For not only is an absolute ban immeasurably simpler
than a ruling permitting some tapping on principles analogous to
search and seizure law, but it is immeasurably safer. If, as liberals
believe, and as Dash reports," in permissive jurisdictions such as
New York many judges issue wiretap orders perfunctorily, while
those who do not are carefully avoided-as may well be the case
with search warrants generally ST-what solace would there be in a
ruling that the fourth amendment applies to - but still permits some
-tapping?
That the applicability of the fourth amendment would provide
something less than a happy solution to the wiretapping problem
may be seen from the cases which engrafted search and seizure
concepts onto the unqualified language of section 605. The Communications Act contains no requirement that the defendant be a
party to the tapped conversation in order to object, and the Nardona
82. BEsEL, op. cit. supra note 80, at 33.

83. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937); 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
84. BmsEL, op. cit. supra note 80, at 83.
85. Id. at 34.
86. See the extracts from TE EAVESDROPPEBS and the accompanying discussion in

Hennings, supranote 26, at 819-20.
87. This is the conclusion I draw from field reports and other data contained in
the unpublished report of the American Bar Foundation pilot project on the administration of criminal justice in the United States. Professor Fred E. Inbau of the
Northwestern University Law School, a consultant to the project, reaches the same
conclusion.
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cases seemed to forbid all direct and derivative use of tapping in
federal courts. Nevertheless, in Goldstein v. United States,88 "the
Court retreated, importing into Section 605 the Fourth and Fifth
Amendment concept of victim's privilege," 8 9 that is, if the defendant
is not himself the victim of the unreasonable search, he has no standing to suppress the illegally seized evidence. Not only did search and
seizure concepts weaken the force of the statute in Goldstein, but
such concepts were also resorted to in Schwartz v. Texas90 to greatly
curtail the sweep of the Communication Act's exclusionary rule, the
only real sanction for enforcing the statutory ban. In Schwartz, despite the wording of 605 prohibiting the "divulgence" of the existence, substance or meaning of intercepted communications in state
as well as federal courts, the Court held state-gathered wiretap
evidence admissible in state cases on analogy to the landmark search
and seizure case of Wolf v. Colorado.91 Where due regard for federal-state relations had only precluded the development of a federal
exclusionary rule for state search and seizure cases, in Schwartz
92
it overrode an exclusionary rule built right into the federal statute.
On the other hand, it is when the Court has steered clear of search
and seizure concepts and confined itself to the "express, absolute
prohibition against the divulgence of wiretapping" contained in
section 605 93 that the hearts of the liberals have been gladdened.
Thus, in Benanti v. United States,94 the Court checked what might
be called its "retreat by analogy" by excluding state-gathered wiretap evidence proferred in a federal prosecution, even though to date
the great weight of authority permits federal prosecutors to use
evidence obtained by illegal state searches so long as there is no
"collusion" between the two sovereignties9 5
So far my niggardly appraisal of the Olmstead debate rests on the
88. 316 U. S. 114 (1942).
89. Westin, The Wire-Tapping Problem: An Analysis and a Legislative Proposal,
52 CoLUM. L. EEv. 165, 180 (1952). As it turns out, it may well have been a short
retreat, see Part Ill-C-(1) infra, but no thanks to fourth amendment concepts.
90. 344 U. S. 199 (1952).

91. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
92. See Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State
and FederalCourts, 43 MINN. L. Bmv. 1083, 1110-12, 1136-37 (1959).
93. Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96, 102 (1957).
94. 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
95. Early statements permitting the use of illegally seized evidence in federal
courts under such circumstances may be found in Byars v. United States, 273 U.S.
28, 33 (1927); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). The rule is still
adhered to by virtually all lower federal courts, although its post-Wolf vitality was
explicitly left open in Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96, 102 n.10 (1957) and
Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79 (1949). See Kamisar, supra note 92, at
1129-40. However, the Court may overturn this doctrine in Rios v. United States, 256
F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. granted, 359 U.S. 965 (1959), or in Elkins v. United
States, 266 F.2d 588 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 361 U.S. 810 (1959).

19601

WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING

view that a contrary ruling would still have permitted some tapping.
But this view has been challenged by so many able students of the
problem that it merits extensive analysis.
B. If the Fourth Amendment Applied, Would It Permit Some
Tapping?
Although the government successfully contended in Olmstead
that no wiretapping was subject to the requirements of the fourth
amendment, the Court did not necessarily treat the matter as an "all
or nothing" proposition. Mr. Justice Brandeis asked, "Can it be that
the Constitution offers no protection2" against wiretapping and
other scientific devices? Not, whether it offers complete protection.
The government, he noted, had conceded that "if wiretapping can
be deemed a search and seizure within the Fourth Amendment,
such wiretapping as was practiced in the case at bar was an unreasonable search and seizure. . . . 97 And Mr. Justice Butler, dissenting separately, conceived "the single question for consideration" to
be whether the government may "have its officers, whenever they
see fit, tap wires ..
." 98
Of course, Mr. Justice Brandeis did assert that "as a means of
espionage, writs of assistance and general warrants are but puny
instruments of tyranny and oppression when compared with wiretapping," 99 but this comment is not unequivocal. When compared
with the unlimited and indiscriminate tapping permitted by the
majority-yes. When compared with the tapping in Olmstead itself- a five month long operation embracing eight phones and
producing 775 typewritten pages of notes of conversations overheard 1 0 -quite possibly. But they are hardly "Puny instruments"
when compared with, for example, the current New York procedure
-whereby a high-ranking officer must establish upon oath or
affirmation "reasonable ground to believe that evidence of crime may
be obtained" and must identify the telephone particularly, as well
as the person or persons whose messages will be interceptedol
to say nothing of even more guarded proposals.0 2
96. 277 U.S. at 474. (Emphasis added.)
97. Id. at 472. (Emphasis added.)
98. Id. at 486. (Emphasis added.)
99. Id. at 476.
100. Id. at 471 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
101. See N.Y. CoDE, Cam. Poc. § 813-a and the discussion of the safeguards
surrounding a court order to tap, in Silver, The Wiretapping-EavesdroppingProblem:
A Prosecutor'sView, 44 MINN. L. REv. 835, 839 (1960).
102. Probably the most complete and most thoughtful wiretapping legislative proposal is one put forth by Professor Alan Westin. See Westin, supranote 89, at 200-208.
He suggests, inter alia, that wiretapping should be allowed only (1) when there are
reasonable grounds to believe that a crime threatening human life has been or is about
to be committed, there are the same grounds to believe that evidence will be obtained
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(1) A brief look at the historicalbackground of the fourth amendment
When one recalls their arbitrary and sweeping nature, it is difficult indeed to regard the writs of assistance and general warrants
as precedents for the view that legalized tapping, no matter how
rigidly proscribed, would violate the spirit and intendment of the
fourth amendment. These old devices were not child's play, by any
standard.
The general warrants of the famous North Briton cases 103 authorized the apprehension of undescribed persons and the indiscriminate
seizure of their papers. Pursuant to a warrant from the Secretary of
State "to search for the authors, printers and publishers of a [specified] seditious and treasonable paper," forty-nine persons were
arrested in three days. 104 It is true that the person to be seized
happened to be particularly described in the most famous English
seizure case of all, Entick v. Carrington,10 but at stake was
whether the secret cabinets and bureaus of every subject in this Kingdom will be
thrown open to the search and inspection of a messenger, whenever the
secretary of state shall think fit to charge, or even to suspect, a person
to be the author, printer, or publisher of a seditious libel.
[U]nder this warrant . . . the lock and doors of every room, box, or
trunk must be broken open; all the papers and books without exception,
if the warrant be executed according to its tenor, must be seized and
essential to the solution or prevention of such crime, and no other means are readily
available; (2) similarly, in the investigation of crimes of treason, espionage and sabotage. Westin would also require that all law enforcement wiretapping devices be
registered with the FCC, which would be empowered to supervise tapping, promulgate
regulations, hold hearings and issue cease and desist orders to law enforcement
agencies.
As to crimes affecting the safety of human life, tapping would be restricted to the
offices of state district attorneys. As to crimes against national security, the Attorney
General would not be required to apply for court orders, a proposal from which I
dissent for the reasons set forth in Donnelly, Comments and Caveats on the Wire
Tapping Controversy, 63 YAL.E L.J. 799, 807-08 (1954), and Williams, The Wiretapping-EavesdroppingProblem: A Defense Counsel's View, 44 MwN. L. REv. 855,
868-69 (1960).
Many other students of the problem are unwilling to authorize law enforcement
tapping except where crimes against national security are at stake, and even then
subject to rigorous safeguards. See, e.g., Donnelly, supra at 807-08; Schwartz, supra
note 46, at 165-66 (and possibly capital offenses); Williams, supra at 868.
103. See, e.g., Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. K.B. 205, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (1763);
Leach v. Three of the King's Messengers, 19 Howell's State Trials 1001 (1765);
Wilkes v. Wood, 19 Howell's State Trials 1153, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (1763).
104. See, e.g., Lasson, The History and Development of the FourthAmendment to
the United States Constitution 43-45, JoHNs HomNs STumms m HwsromcAL ANM
PoLTIcAL Sc-wcE, Series 55, No. 2 (1937); Andrews, HistoricalSurvey of the Law
of Searches and Seizures, 34 LAw NoTEs 42, 43 (1930); Wood, The Scope of the
Constitutional Immunity Against Searches and Seizures, 34 W. VA. L.Q. 1, 4-7
(1927).
105. 19 Howell's State Trials, col. 1029 (Ct. C.P. 1765).
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carried away; for it is observable, that nothing is left either to the discretion or to the humanity of the officer. 10 6
[The party] has no power to reclaim his goods, even after his innocence
is cleared by acquittal.....
[N]o charge is requisite to prove that the party has any criminal papers
in his custody .. . 107

Lord Camden was not persuaded that "such a power can be justified by the common law";108 this is not to say he was persuaded it
could not be justified under any conditions:
If libels may be seized, it ought to be laid down with precision, when,
where, upon what charge, against whom, by what magistrate, and in
what stage of the prosecution. All these particulars must be explained and
proved to be law, before this general proposition can be established. 1 9

Indeed, to no small extent Entick can be distinguished away on
the ground that it dealt with seditious materials. The grave threat

to what we now call first amendment liberties posed by relatively
unrestrained searches and seizures in the area of seditious libel did
not, I am sure, escape Lord Camden."10 No more than it has a

number of modem commentators who explicitly and emphatically
exclude from any proposal for limited wiretapping, investigations in
connection with loyalty programs and those "national security" or
"defense" offenses which are really sedition laws."'
The writs of assistance, which were used by customs officers for
the detection of smuggled goods, "were even more arbitrary in their
nature and more open to abuse than the general warrants of the

North Briton cases."

2 The

writ-

was not returnable at all after execution, but was good as a continuous
license and authority during the whole lifetime of. the reigning sovereign.
The discretion delegated to the official was therefore practically absolute
and unlimited. The writ empowered the officer and his deputies and
servants to search, at their will, wherever they suspected uncustomed
goods to be, and to break open any receptacle or package falling under
their suspecting eye.113

If, as has been said, James Otis' epochal argument against writs of
106. Id. at cols. 1063-64.
107. Id. at cols. 1066-67.
108. Id. at 1072.
109. Ibid.
110. Id. at cols. 1070, 1071, 1074. See also Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and
Seizures, 34 HI- v.L. REv. 361, 362-63 (1920).
111. See Donnelly, supra note 102, at 807-08; Schwartz, On Current Proposalsto
Legalize Wire Tapping, 103 U. PA.. L. REv. 157, 165 (1954); Westin, supra note
89, at 205.
112. Lasson, supra note 104, at 54.
113. Ibid.
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assistance in 1761 "was enshrined in the Massachusetts Constitution
of 1780" 114 and "when Madison came to deal with safeguards against
search and seizure in the United States Constitution . . . [he] based

his proposal on the Massachusetts form," 15 I find nothing in this
form to preclude limited tapping by court order. The terms of
article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights are:
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches
and seizures of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions.
All warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the cause or foundation of them be not previously supported by oath or affirmation, and if
the order in the warrant to a civil officer, to make search in suspected
places, or to arrest one or more suspected persons, or to seize their property, be not accompanied with a special designation of the persons or
objects of search, arrest;or seizure; and no warrant ought to be issued,
but in cases, and with the formalities prescribed by the laws."16

Nor is it at all difficult to square limited tapping by court order
with the famous Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776, "the first American

precedent of a constitutional character for the Fourth Amend-

ment," 117 or with the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, adopted

later the same year, "the first precedent which closely approximated
what is now the Fourth Amendment. . ... 3,3"8

All in all, I find the governmental abuses which led to the adoption
of the fourth amendment much more aggravated than need be law
enforcement tapping. I fail to see how the history of the fourth

amendment renders every kind of tapping, no matter how guarded
the permission, no matter how limited the areas, a violation of the

spirit and intendment of the amendment.
Nor does the wording of the amendment bother me very much.

The amendment does call for a warrant "particularly describing" the
"things to be seized." However, if to rule that conversations are not
114. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justices Murphy and Rutledge, dissenting
in Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 158 (1947).
115. Ibid.
116. Reprinted, ibid. (Emphasis added.) This article was the first to use the

phrase "unreasonable searches and seizures"; other states had merely condemned
general warrants. See Lasson, supra note 104, at 82.

117. Lasson, supra note 104, at 79. It condemned general warrants wherebyan officer or messenger may be commanded to search suspected places without
evidence of a fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, or
whose offense is not particularly described and supported by evidence ...
Id. at 79 n.3. See also the statement of desired amendments adopted by the Virginia
Convention after ratifying the Federal Constitution, GREENMAN, WnE-TA PIn: ITs
REanroN vo Crv. LmERTrs 9-10 (1938).
118. Id. at 81. It outlawed warrants without oaths or affirmation first made, affording a sufficient foundation
for them, and whereby any officer or messenger may be commanded or required

to search suspected places, or to seize any person or persons, his or their
property....
Id. at 81 n.11.
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"papers" or "effects" or capable of being "seized" is to read the
fourth amendment "with the literalness of a country parson interpreting the first chapter of Genesis," 119 to contend on the other hand
that such conversations are not only constitutionally protected, but
incapable of being "particularly described" in advance, and therefore beyond the reach of any court order, 20 is not to display much
more sophistication. Surely wiretapping opponents do not have to
be reminded that "it is a Constitution we are expounding." 121
(2) Justices Douglas and Murphy on limited wiretapping
No less adamant defenders of civil liberties than Mr. Justice
Douglas and the late Mr. Justice Murphy seem to support the view
that application of the fourth amendment would not ban all tapping.
Mr. Justice Douglas does not seem to have focused on the specific
problem of limited tapping to the extent that Mr. Justice Murphy
did, but in two of his recent books, he at least blithely assumes that
if Olmstead were to be overruled taps could and would be conducted in much the same manner that other "searches" have long
been lawfully made:
[N]ever has a majority of the Court held that wiretapping was within
the protection of the Fourth Amendment. The Court has refused to
require the police and prosecutor to get a122search warrant based on probable cause in order to tap a person's wire.
The main struggle here has not been to prohibit wiretapping absolutely,
as Puerto Rico does, but to bring wire-tapping under the Fourth Amendment. That is to say, the controversy in the United States has been whether
wiretapping is a "search" within the meaning of the Amendment. If so,
it requires a showing of probable cause to a magistrate 123
that a crime has
been or is being committed before a wire can be tapped.

Mr. Justice Murphy lends me support in, of all places, his Brandeis-like dissent in Goldman v. United States. 24 Indeed he indicated
on that occasion that even if such practices were held to be governed
by the fourth amendment, not only some tapping, but some electronic eavesdropping as well, would still be permissible:
119. BmsEL, op. cit. supra note 80, at 32.
120. See, e.g., National Lawyers Guild, Is Anybody Listening? A Report on
Pending Wiretap Legislation (1954), reprinted in Hearings on H.R. 862, 867, 4518,
4728 & 5906 Before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary,

84th Cong. 1st Sess., ser. 2, at 227, 229 (1955).
121. The oft-quoted remark of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819), recalled by Brandeis in his Olmstead
dissent, 277 U.S. at 472.
122. DouGr..s, WE THE JuGEs 375 (1956).
123. DouciGLs, THE scHr oF THE PEoPrL 149 (1958). See also id. at 150-51.
124. 316 U.S. 129, 136 (1942).
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Such invasions of privacy, unless they are authorized by a warrant issued
in the manner and form prescribed by the Amendment, or otherwise conducted under adequate safeguards defined by statute, are at one with
the evils which have heretofore been held to be within the Fourth
Amendment ....

125

A warrant can be devised which would permit the use of a detectaphone. Cf. article 1, § 12 of the New York Constitution (1938) ....
[S]ome method of responsible administrative supervision could be evolved
for the use of the detectaphone which, like the valid search warrant,
would adequately protect the privacy of the individual against irresponsible and indiscriminate intrusions by Government officers. ....
While the detectaphone is primarily used to obtain evidence, and while
such use appears to be condemned by the rulings of this Court . . . I am

not prepared to say that this purpose necessarily makes all detectaphone
"'searches" unreasonable, no matter what the circumstances, or the pro12 6
cedural safeguards employed.

Deep down, Mr. Justice Murphy may have really believed this.
Perhaps not. Perhaps he may have simply concluded that while a
majority of the Court might someday be sold on the idea that the
fourth amendment applies to tapping and eavesdropping, a majority
-let alone the public-would never buy the idea that the Constitution prevents law enforcement officers from engaging in any such
practices under any conditions. I do not know. I am not at all sure
it makes any difference.

(3) The ban on searches for objects of "evidentiary value only"
As Mr. Justice Murphy recognized in the passage above, any
proposal for limited tapping must reckon with the rule articulated in
Gouled v. United States 2 7 and other cases 128 that objects of "evidentiary value only" are beyond the reach of an otherwise valid
warrant. Although the rule is often pronounced in, and confused
with, cases of "exploratory" searches, that is, general searches for the
sake of discovering evidence or in the hope that evidence, particu-

larly documents, might be uncovered, the rule has a force of its
own. 29 It applies however elaborately described the particular
125. Id. at 139-40. (Emphasis added.)
126. Id. at 140 n.7.
127. 255 U.S. 298, 809-11 (1921).
128. See, e.g., Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 237-38 (1960); Harris v.
United States, 831 U.S. 145, 154 (1947); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452,
464-66 (1932).
129. See Comment, Limitations on Seizure of "Evidentiary Objects"-A Rule in
Search of a Reason, 20 U. Cm. L. REv. 319, 320 n.5 (1953) [hereinafter cited as
Chicago Comment].
The "evidentiary only" rule seems to find its origin in Entick v. Carrington, 19
Howell's State Trials 1029 (1765), where great concern was expressed over the
exploratory and indiscriminate nature of the search at issue, id. at cols. 1063-65,
1067-68, 1070. One of the unsuccessful arguments in defense of the warrant was that
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"evidentiary" object sought. Thus, those who resist any modification

of the present ban can say:
[I]t appears that wiretapping is a more drastic interference than is constitutionally permissible under search warrant. A search warrant must
specify the things for which the officer is to search and, in general, these
must be either articles used to commit the crime or else the proceeds of
crime. A search for an object of purely evidentiary significance would
almost certainly be held unconstitutional, as in case the warrant purported
to authorize the seizure of a personal diary containing an account of the
alleged crime. But wire tapping is unavoidably a hunt for evidence, pure
130
and simple, i.e., for incriminating admissions.

As formulated, the rule does indeed loom as an awesome barrier
to proponents of limited tapping. On reading the most comprehensive and careful study of the problem, however, it becomes considerably less imposing:
"In most instances, the courts have accepted the Gouled rule upon
faith or have neglected to make explicit the reasons for applying the
rule";13 1 on close inspection none of the various rationales trotted out
in defense of the rule can be regarded as acceptable; 132 not infrecourts, to put it kindly, just don't take the rule very
quently the
33
seriously.1
If the rise of a crime wave,3 real or imagined, or the needs of a

"such a search is a means of detecting offenders by discovering evidence," id. at
1073; Lord Camden seems to have condemned not a search for specific objects of
"evidentiary value only" as much as what might be called hope-and-a-prayer searches,
i.e., "a right of search for the sake of discovering evidence only," id. at 1074. However, Lord Camden also relied on (1) the notion that private papers are the party's
"own property," while stolen property, which can be seized, is not, id. at 1066;
(2) the ground that a search for papers and records compels the furnishing of selfincriminating evidence, id. at 1073. See the discussion in Handler, The Constitutionality of Investigationsby the Federal Trade Commission: 1, 28 COLuTm. L. Rzv. 905,
910-18 (1928).
130. Schwartz, supranote 111, at 163. See also, e.g., Rosenzweig, The Law of Wire
Tapping, 32 CoRNiELI L.Q. 514, 531-32 (1947); Williams, supra note 102, at 85758, 870-71.
131. Chicago Comment 332.
132. After a painstaking analysis of various suggested rationales (for example: the
privilege against self-incrimination is violated by a seizure of evidentiary objects;
the invalidation of such a seizure turns on the "title" or "stake" the possessor has in
the objects, unlike the case of stolen property or contraband; the rule enhances the
protection of privacy by immunizing from seizure certain personal property), the
conclusion is reached in Chicago Comment 330 that "the Gouled rule lacks an
acceptable rationale."
After some valiant earlier efforts to explain the Gouled rule, United States v.
Poller, 43 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1930), United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202,
204 (2d Cir. 1926), the Second Circuit has more or less thrown up its hands,
Matthews v. Correa, 135 F.2d 534, 537 (2d Cir. 1943) (per Clark, J.): "The line
between fruit of the crime itself and mere evidence thereof may be narrow; perhaps
this turns more on the good faith of the search than the actual distinction between
the matters turned up."
133. See text at notes 137-142 infra.
134. It has been suggested that "the Court in the Olmstead case decided the issue
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national emergency, 3 5 valid or otherwise, generate sufficient pressure to push some reasonably well-drafted bill for limited tapping
through Congress and such a statute collides with the limitation on
seizure of "evidentiary" objects, aptly called "a rule in search of a
reason," 3 " 1 suspect the rule, not the statute, will be much the worse
for it. If the rule does survive such an encounter, I venture to say,
it will be because proponents of limited tapping need not demolish
it; they can go through, over, and all around it quite nicely.
Look at the precedents we have on the books right now: In one
customs case, letters and other seized papers prepared by or sent to
the defendant, many of them routine and unoffending in themselves,
were admitted since they were said to be "used . . . to perpetrate
the crime in question"; 37 in another customs case, a seized memorandum simply listing various watch movements defendant intended to smuggle into the country was admitted because "some
such list was a necessity in this type of smuggling";13 8 the seized
correspondence between the defendant and German radio and other
officials "to obtain employment" with a German station was allowed
in evidence as "means through which an alleged treason, namely
performance of the duties of a news editor in the . . . station . . .
was accomplished. 39
Only a short six months before Olmstead (when, according to
many commentators, a ruling that the tapping was a "search" would
in favor of constitutionality in order to permit Congress to regulate wiretapping or
outlaw it in accordance with the rise or ebb of the crime wave." Rosenzweig, supra
note 130, at 531. Relying on the Gouled doctrine, Rosenzweig takes the position that
a contrary ruling in Olmstead would have precluded even the most closely supervised
tapping because if tapping "were held a search it must be an unreasonable search."
Id. at 532.
135. A strong movement arose during World War II to permit wiretapping in the
prosecution of the war, one which not even the civil liberties groups opposed. See
Westin, supra note 89, at 180 n.71. Professor Westin suggests that the disputed
Roosevelt "authorization" of tapping at this time rendered the issue moot. Ibid. See
notes 210-11 infra and accompanying text.
136. See note 129 supra. Professor Maguire similarly refers to the "obscurely
implied grounds" for considering objects sought solely for their evidential value
improper subjects of governmental search. MAGUmE, EVIDNCE o GUILT 183 (1959).
137. United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1930) (per L. Hand).
138. Landau v. United States, 82 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1936).
139. United States v. Best, 76 F. Supp. 857, 861 (D. Mass. 1948). See also United
States v. Bell, 48 F. Supp. 986 (S.D. Cal. 1943), where, in a prosecution for conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act, "closets and cabinets were opened, and large
quantities of letters, printed literature, documents, pamphlets, and the like" were
admitted, id. at 989, because "connected with" the commission of the crime, or
because they "supply proof relating to the transaction out of which it arose," id. at
995, whatever that means; Matthews v. Correa, 135 F.2d 534, 537 (2d Cir. 194),
where the seizure of seven address books and an account book from a woman
charged with concealing property from her trustee in bankruptcy was sustained on
the ground that "these books, though dealing in part with matters subsequent to the
bankruptcy, did properly concern matters with which the trustee was concerned."
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also have meant that all taps were forbidden searches for evidence)
in a prosecution for conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition
Act, a unanimous Supreme Court not only upheld the admission of
a seized ledger showing inventories of liquors, receipts, and expenses
but gas, electric, and telephone bills as well. The bills, it seems,
were "convenient, if not in fact necessary, for the keeping of the
accounts; and, as they were so closely related to the business, it is
not unreasonable to consider them as used to carry it on." 140 If this
double-talk can be topped, another prohibition case did so by not
only admitting order books, stock books, invoices and price lists "means and instrumentalities of committing [the] ...conspiracy"14 1-but also a typewriter and adding machine They were
"shown to have been used in the business by the records made with
them."

142

I do not mean to suggest that other courts have not come out
differently on similar fact situations. They have. 143 My point is that
the area is so cluttered with inconsistencies and uncertainties as to
permit much freedom of movement.144 While "a search for an object
of purely evidentiary significance" may be taboo, objects have been
and will continue to be found to possess a bit more than "purely
evidentiary significance" just about whenever a resourceful judge
wants to so find.
If memoranda, in themselves unoffending, may properly be seized
because "necessary" or "convenient" to record some detail of
defendant's nefarious activities, as may written communications
passing between actors because somehow they are "means" or
"instrumentalities" used in the commission of a crime, why not
phone conversations? For example, phone conversations by members
of "organized and vicious rackets and criminal syndicates [who]
...could not organize or operate their syndicates without the telephone." 1 45 Or by enemy agents who because "the success of their
plans frequently rests upon piecing together shreds of information
140.
141.
142.
148.

(1940).

Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927).
Foley v. United States, 64 F.2d 1, 2 (5th Cir. 1933).
Id. at 4.
See Chicago Comment 820-22 & n.22; Annot., 129 A.L.R. 1296, 1300-01

144. The confusion is only compounded by the Supreme Court's decision ad-.
mitting into evidence as "the means" by which the government had been defrauded
a cancelled check seized in the course of an audit.,Zap v. United States, 328 U.S.
624, 629 n.7 (1946). The dissent complained that papers the possession of which
involved no infringement of law' had been seized for "evidentiary use," yet seemed
to agree that such evidence could have been secured by a lawful warrant. Id. at
632-33. The difficult task of reconciling Zap with Gouled was undertaken by the late
Professor Reynard in Freedom from Unreasonable Search and Seizure-a Second
Class ConstitutionalRight, 25 IND. L.J. 259, 282-86 (1950).
145. Dilworth & Dash, A Wiretap Proposal,59 Dicx. L. REv. 195, 199 (1955).
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received from many sources" and because they themselves are
"often dispersed and stationed in various strategic positions in
government and industry" are said to turn to the phone "as a matter
of necessity."

146

The retort, no doubt, is that criminals, organized or

otherwise, either do not utilize the phone in their working hours,
or do so in such a discriminating manner that next to nothing is to
be gaining by permitting law enforcement personnel to tap. That is
another question. 147 The instant question is: if sufficient need for
law enforcement tapping is demonstrated, can a statute to this effect
be drawn which does not violate the spirit and history of the fourth
amendment?
I have argued at some length that if the question presented in
Olmstead had been decided the other way, as it should have been
and may yet be, some law enforcement tapping would still be constitutionally permissible. But I am not at all sure that I need to so
contend in order to make the argument that the present arrangement offers more protection against tapping-or at least as much
- than would have been achieved by a contrary ruling in that
celebrated case. That when all is said and done at least nothing
much was lost in Olmstead.
C. What if the Fourth Amendment Applied To-But Permitted
No-. .Wiretapping?
From this point on, I am willing to assume arguendo that if tapping had been held subject to the requirements of the fourth amendment all tapping would have been forbidden by the amendment to
the extent all "unreasonable searches" currently are. But we already
have such a ban now, and have had for a generation. Moreover, in a
number of respects the protection now afforded by section 605 goes
well beyond anything that would or even could be furnished by
the fourth amendment.
(1) A comparisonof the scope of protectionafforded by the fourth
amendment and section 605
The constitutional distinction drawn last term in Frank v. Maryland 14s between searches designed to enforce "civil" regulations and

those for evidence to be used in "criminal" proceedings raises anew
146. Brownell, The Public Security and Wire Tapping, 39 ComRmE
L.Q. 195,
202 (1954).
147. See text at notes 47-49 supra.
148. 359 U.S. 360 (1959), ably discussed in Comments, 44 MN-N. L. REv. 513
(1960); 108 U. PA. L. REv. 265 (1959). A month after the Frank decision, the four
dissenters in that case voted to note probable jurisdiction in a quite similar case. State
ex tel. Eaton v. Price, 168 Ohio St. 123, 151 N.E.2d 523 (1958), prob. juris. noted,
360 U.S. 246 (1959).

1.960]

WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING

a host of questions about the fourth amendment protection afforded
"quasi-defendants," that is, the many persons-whether they be
government employees charged with disloyalty or aliens facing
deportation or public figures investigated by legislative committees
-who "get into difficulties with government .. .and are exposed
to the danger of suffering the most severe penalties, without being
in a position to claim the [criminal] defendant's rights."149
The difficulties are well illustrated by the fourth amendment
problems in connection with deportation proceedings, problems
which badly split the Court as recently as this term in Abel v. United
States.150 Since petitioner had not made the challenge below, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority, purported to reserve
judgment until another day on the validity of Immigration and Naturalization "administrative" warrants for arrest preliminary to deportation. However, while the question was said to be "not entitled to
our consideration,"1 51 Mr. Justice Frankfurter proceeded to give it
his most serious consideration -leaving little doubt that he would
sustain such warrants. 52
All the Court had to decide in Abel was that a search incident to
an administrative arrest was valid at least when no broader than
and analogous in purpose to those permitted as incidents to "criminal" arrests. 153 Some hints were dropped, however, that warrantless
searches by immigration officers transcending the limits permitted
law enforcement officers might also be sustained. 1 4 Why not?
If the issuance and execution of a warrant for arrest pending
deportation need not comply with the requirements of the fourth
amendment, and there is much authority to this effect,'1 5 why must
149. FELm"w, THE DErENDANT'S PIGHTS 213 (1958). "They are at best only
quasi-defendants, and therefore, to paraphrase Justice Holmes, their rights are shaded
by a quasi." Ibid. For excellent general treatments of the problem see 1 DAvis,
AmILsTRaATrVE LAw TnATISE ch. 7 (1958); FELLmAN, supra at ch. 12.
150. 362 U.S. 217 (1960) (permitting evidence seized during a warrantless search
incident to an arrest under an administrative deportation warrant to be used in a
criminal prosecution).
151. Id. at 230.
152. Id. at 230-34.
153. Id. at 236.
154.
If anything, we ought to be more vigilant, not less, to protect individuals
and their property from warrantless searches made for the purpose of turning
up proof to convict than we are to protect them from searches for matter
bearing on deportability. According to the uniform decisions of this Court
deportation proceedings are not subject to the constitutional safeguards for
criminal prosecutions. Searches for evidence of crime present situations demand-"
ing the greatest, not the least, restraint upon the Government's intrusion into
privacy; although its protection is not limited to them, it was at these searches
which the fourth amendment was primarily directed.
Id. at 237.
155. See id. at 230-34; Comment, 107 U. PA. L. PEn,. 1192, 1193-95 (1959).
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a search? Or, at least one pertaining to alienage or to an alien's commission of deportable offenses? Is it too simple to assert that either
the fourth amendment applies to procedures preliminary to deportation proceedings or it does not? The fourth amendment guarantees
"the right of the people to be secure" first of all "in their persons." 16
Is not, then, an unreasonable seizure of the person a greater evil than
7
the similar seizure of one's "effects"? 15

Put it this way. Suppose Olmstead had outlawed all wiretapping
to the extent the fourth amendment now prohibits "unreasonable
searches." Suppose, further, that in addition to their current power
to issue administrative warrants for arrest pending deportation
whenever "necessary or desirable," 158 the Attorney General and his

delegate were also given comparable statutory authority to issue
orders to tap aliens' phones. I am not nearly as sure as I would like
to be that such a statute would be found unconstitutional.
Put it another way. Suppose Olmstead had banned wiretapping
and section 605 had never been enacted or, if so, not interpreted
as it has been. Suppose, further, that immigration officials -without
statutory authority-had tapped an alien's phone and sought to use
evidence so obtained in a deportation proceeding against him. I
have little doubt the Court would have some unkind things to say
to the immigration officials, but I seriously doubt whether such
evidence would be suppressed.' 5 9 Even in a state prosecution for a
capital offense, due process does not demand the exclusion of logically relevant evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and
seizure. 60 Why, then, must or should the Court invoke the exclusionary rule in a deportation proceeding? After all, "according to the
uniform decisions of this Court," Mr. Justice Frankfurter reminded
us in Abel, "deportation proceedings are not subject to the constitutional safeguards for criminal prosecutions."' 6
156. U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV.
157. See Comment, 107 U. PA. L. BEv. 1192, 1195-98 (1959).
158. See 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(a) (1958), regulations under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).
159. Cf. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
160. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). Wolf itself was not a capital case,
but it is quite clear that the decision covers capital cases as well.
161. 362 U.S. at 237.
The Court ruled in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) that
since "the order of deportation is not a punishment for crime . . .the provisions of
the Constitution . . .prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures . . .have no
application." One commentator has regarded this ruling 'limited" by United States
ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149 (1923), where Mr. Justice Brandeis is said
to have "stated for the Court" that evidence obtained via illegal search and seizure
could not be made the basis of a finding in a deportation proceeding. See Wray,
Application of the Fourth Amendment to Civil Proceedings, 14 FoOD DauG Cosm.
L.J. 534, 544-45 (1959). However, Brandeis expressly assumed this was the law,
263 U.S. at 155, in order to quickly dispose of appellant's contention, for he had not
been subjected to a search or seizure at all, illegal or otherwise. Ibid.
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On the other hand, the unqualified language of section 605 and
its "built-in" exclusionary rule make it a good deal clearer, if not
absolutely clear, that aliens facing deportation and other "quasidefendants" can invoke its protection. Indeed the broad sweep of
the statute seems to extend even to ordinary civil litigation with the
United States, perhaps even to all private civil litigation in the
federal courts as well.162
There is some lower federal court authority for the view that an alien facing
deportation is entitled to the protection of the fourth amendment, see Wray, supra,
at 544-45; Comment, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 619, 620 (1959), but the cases cited take the
general approach that the Constitution's safeguards are as applicable to deportation
as criminal proceedings- an approach emphatically rejected by the Supreme Court
in recent decisions. See Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955) (that hearing officer
was subject to supervision and control of investigating and prosecuting officers does
not deprive alien of due process); Carlson v. London, 342 U.S. 524 (1952) (detention of certain classes of aliens without bail, at the Attorney Generals discretion,
pending determination as to their deportability, violates neither due process nor right
to bail); Harisiades v. Shaugbnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (prohibition against ex
post facto enactments inapplicable to deportation acts).
162. See MAGUmE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 203 n.16 (1959).
Although the chief counsel for the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities
in the Labor or Management Field (McClellan Committee) made frequent use of
recordings covering intercepted phone conversations in the Committee's 1957 hearings,
the decision to do so-made prior to the Benanti decision-was based on the
grounds that the tapping had been conducted by state officers and much, perhaps all,
had been pursuant to New York court order. See the discussion in MA.umE, supra
at 247 n.16.
Whether section 605 can be invoked to ban the use of information derived from
wiretap "lears" in a non-criminal proceeding is unclear. Viewing the Nardone and
Benanti cases, which forbid the use of such derivative information in federal prosecutions, as an exercise of the Court's supervisory powers over the administration of
federal criminal justice, Professor Howard Sacks concludes that since "in the case
of administrative proceedings . . . no such supervisory power exists . . . it would
appear that the Supreme Court would have no basis on which to directly forbid a
loyalty tribunal from considering information derived from wiretapping." Sacks,
FederalCivilian Employees Security Program:An Analysis of the Wright Commission
Report, 52 Nw. U.L. BEv. 715, 745 n.114 (1958). However, Professor Sacks goes on
to suggest that on analogy to Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956) (a federal
court can enjoin a federal officer from using his illegal search and seizure as the basis
of testimony in a state prosecution), a federal court could similarly enjoin a federal
employee from giving derivative wiretap evidence at a loyalty hearing. Ibid.
While there is language in the second Nardone and Benanti cases to support
Professor Sacek's view, a more reasonable interpretation of these cases, I submit, is
that whenever wires are tapped in violation of section 605, the use of evidence
derived from such misconduct also constitutes "a violation of the purpose and policy
of that statute," as the Court put it, looking back on the second Nardone case in
Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, 118 (1942). In a federal administrative
proceeding, as well as in a federal judicial proceeding, it would seem that "'the
essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that
.. . it shall not be used at all.' . . . A decent respect for the policy of Congress must
save us from imputing to it a self-defeating, if not disingenuous purpose." Nardone v.
United States, 308 U.S. at 340-41. Whatever may be said for the opposing demands
of federalism in a state proceeding, cf. Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952), the
fact that the derivative use of wiretap information constitutes a violation of the
purpose and policy of section 605 should operate to exclude such evidence from
any federal proceeding, administrative or judicial.
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Furthermore, even where the proceedings are "criminal," the
fourth amendment, as construed to date, could not strike at wiretapping to the extent that section 605 can. The present ban operates
to exclude all wiretap evidence from the federal courts regardless of
who did the tapping; 163 not so the fourth amendment. Absent a
showing that federal officers participated in the enterprise-no easy
task for the defendant-private individuals or local police could
tap despite a fourth amendment ban and turn the evidence over to
federal authorities for use in a federal prosecution. 164
As I have contended elsewhere, in an era of overlapping state and
federal crime legislation and hand-in-hand state and federal law
enforcement, this exception to the federal exclusionary rule presents
65
an alarming temptation to, and opportunity for, circumvention.
The dangers are only enhanced when wiretapping is substituted for
illegal search and seizure. For example, suppose city or state tappers
merely furnish federal authorities with "leads." The federal court
must be satisfied that (1) defendant was tapped, (2) federal authorities collaborated with local law enforcement tappers, (8) the evidence proferred by the federal prosecutor was obtained primarily
from the state tap, not from independent state sources, (4) nor from
independent federal sources. Taken together, these evidentiary
difficulties are virtually insurmountable.'66
Furthermore, once a government witness admits that a tap had been placed on
the subject at some point, this in itself is a specific violation of the statute. "For
Section 605 forbids the divulgence of 'the existence . . .' of the intercepted message," Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. at 100, as well as apparently, the continued
use of "evidence now linked to a disclosed wiretap." Id. at 101.
Quaere, does not the use of evidence derived from wiretapping also violate the
wording in section 6057 that "no person having become acquainted with the contents,
substance, purport, effect or the meaning of [the intercepted communication] ...
shall . . . use the same or any information therein contained for his own benefit or
for the benefit of another not entitled thereto"? (Emphasis added.)
163. Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
164. See note 95 supra and accompanying text.
165. See Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in
State and Federal Courts, 43 MmN. L. REv. 1083, 1165-95, 1197-98 (1959).
166. The substantial difficulties confronting the defendant who seeks to establish

simply that taps were placed on him in the first place are ably considered in Note,

61 YALEu L. J. 1221 (1952). When and if this initial hurdle is cleared, it is unsettled
whether the burden remains on the defendant to convince the court that such
tapping "led" to the proferred evidence or falls on the prosecution to prove that the
connection between such evidence and the tapping has, in the language of the second
Nardone case, 308 U.S. at 341, "become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint." A
number of cases place both burdens on defendant. See generally, MAGUmE, op. cit.
supra note 162, at 221-25; Bernstein, The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree, 37 ILL. L.
REv. 99 (1942); Annot., 28 A.L.R. 1055 (1953).
That law enforcement officials accumulate and piece together valuable information
by listening into numerous phone conversations, many of which are guarded and
largely unintelligible in themselves, see Silver, supra note 101, at 845, only serves to
aggravate the problems of proof. Consider, e.g., Sullivan v. United States, 95 U.S.
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True, in Schwartz v. Texas,167 section 605 was held not to prevent
the divulgence of state-gathered wiretap evidence in state courts
any more than does the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure.'6 But the statement in United States v.

Benanti,69 excluding wiretap evidence obtained by state officers
pursuant to state law from the federal courts, that "Congress, setting out a prohibition in plain terms, did not mean to allow state
70
legislation which would contradict that section and that policy" 1
may spell the beginning of the end for state court admissibility in
the wiretapping area.171
Even if Schwartz survives, the statutory ban offers more possibil-

ities for effectuating the prohibition against tapping in state cases
than would a constitutional ban. While the illegal search and seizure
is complete before trial, the wording of section 605 renders a disclosure of wiretap evidence at a state trial, a federal crime at that time.

Unless and until the Supreme Court of the United States rules to
the contrary, a conscientious state trial judge "faced with the un-

savory alternative of allowing a federal crime in his court or of not
following the state's rule of evidence"' 71 may well balk at the former
alternative.
Further, the fact that the use of wiretap evidence in a state trial
would be the commission of a federal crime may enable a federal
court to enjoin a state prosecutor from introducing such evidence.
App. D.C. 78, 80, 219 F.2d 760, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1955). By intercepting a phone
conversation between defendant and X, police learned the two were meeting at a
specified time at a location described only as "the usual place." At the meeting police
arrested defendant and seized narcotics he had sold. Since the police had learned
the location of the "usual place" as well as the fact that X was seeking an appointment with defendant prior to the interception (in this particular case neither item
was picked up from other taps), the court admitted the evidence on the ground
that the interception "did not . .. enable them to be present at the criminal transaction."
167. 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
168. Wolf v. Colorado, 838 U.S. 25 (1949).
169. 855 U.S. 96 (1957).
170. Id. at 105--06.
171. See, e.g., Savarese, Eavesdropping and the Law, 46 A.B.A.J. 263 (1960).
Further evidence of the questionable status of the Schwartz rule is in the campaign
the New York police and district attorneys have been waging to secure congressional
enactment of the following Keating-Celler Bill:
No law of the United States shall be construed to prohibit interception, by
any law enforcement officer or agency of any State (or any political subdivision
thereof) in compliance with the provisions of any statute of such State, of any
wire or radio communication, or the divulgence, in any proceeding in any court
of such state, of the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning
of any communication so intercepted, if such interception was made after
determination by a court of such State that reasonable grounds existed for belief
that such interception might disclose evidence of the commission of a crime.
S.8340, H.R. 11589, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3501 (1960).
172. DAmH at 399.
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just recently, a regular division of the Second Circuit, fully aware
that similar intervention in a state search and seizure case is precluded, 173 enjoined the admission of wiretap evidence in a state
prosecution, 174 only to be reversed by the Circuit sitting en bane,
3-1-1.1 75 Judge Waterman, however, concurred "principally" on the
expectation that the state judges will exclude such evidence on their
own, 7776 and less than a week later one New York judge did just
that.

Until the High Court is heard from, the whole area of wiretapping
and federal-state relations must be regarded as quite unsettled. At
the moment, one can say at least that the prospects for overruling
Schwartz are a good deal brighter than they are for overruling Wolf
and that the case for enjoining the use of wiretap evidence in a state
trial is considerably stronger than for similar intervention in a state
search and seizure case.
The statutory prohibition against tapping can be compared with
the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure
in still another area. While Goldstein v. United States 7 1 has some-

times been viewed as authority for the proposition that a defendant
who is not a party to the tapped call can no more invoke section 605
than can one who is not a direct victim of an unreasonable search
and seizure invoke the Constitution, 179 it is far from clear that the

analogy to the fourth amendment cases was ever so complete. Goldstein's co-conspirators were induced to confess and turn state's
evidence by divulging to them the contents of intercepted telephone
messages. At the trial, as the Supreme Court was careful to point
173. Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951).
174. Pugach v. Dollinger, 275 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1960). Judge Medina, who wrote
the majority opinion, had resorted to search and seizure analogy in Benanti, only to
be reversed by a unanimous Supreme Court. Evidently, he was determined not to
make that mistake again.
175. Pugach v. Dollinger, 28 U.S.L. W=z 2527 (2d Cir. April 14, 1960). Judge
Medina, the author of the earlier opinion to the contrary, did not sit.
176. Id. at 2528. Judge Waterman branded "presumptuous" the assumption that
any New York state trial judge will acquiesce to the commission of a crime against
the United States in his presence." If subsequent state action no longer renders this
thought "presumptuous," I take it Judge Waterman would side with dissenting Judge
Clark.
177. Nassau County Court Judge Widlitz in the case of People v. O'Rourke relying
heavily on Judge Waterman's concurring opinion in Pugach. See N.Y. Times, April
20, 1960, p. 34, col. 2. As in the Pugach case, defendant in the O'Rourke case had
sought to enjoin the admission of wiretap evidence in the state criminal proceeding;
however, his petition was denied. O'Rourke v. Levine, 181 F. Supp. 947 (E.D.N.Y.
1960). And this denial was affirmed by the Second Circuit en bane in a companion
case to Pugach, 28 U.S.L. WF.n 2527 (2d Cir. April 14, 1960).
178. 316 U.S. 114 (1942).
179. See, e.g., Bradley & Hogan, Wiretapping: From Nardone to Benanti and
Rathbun, 46 G~o. L.J. 418, 427-29, 431 (1958). Some language in Goldstein supports
this view. See 316 U.S. at 121.
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out, they "did not testify either to the existence of the communications or to their contents." s0 Thus, even before the Supreme Court
handed down the Benanti opinion a keen observer suggested that if
such a divulgence were to occur in federal courts it "would probably
be barred even against those not party to the tapped conversation,
either on the theory that a defendant has standing to object to the
commission of a crime at his trial or on the theory that a federal
court cannot tolerate the commission of a federal crime in its presence." 181 After Benanti, emphasizing as it does the fact that the
conviction was brought about by the commission of a federal crime
in federal court, it is fairly clear that Goldstein is so limited.' 2 Indeed, the next time around the court may well extirpate what
remains of the notion, imported from fourth and fifth amendment
cases, that assertion of one's rights under section 605 is a personal
matter.8 3 In any event, I think it may fairly be said that here, too,
the statute already provides broader protection against tapping
than would the fourth amendment.
(2) The problem of non-telephonic eavesdropping
Section 605 does furnish the protection against tapping Olmstead
failed to provide, but what about other forms of electronic eavesdropping? Is not what was really lost in Olmstead-and remains
lost- the protection against the detectaphone and the concealed
microphone?
I think it fair to say that inadequate protection exists in this area,
not so much because the Court took the wrong road in Olmstead
but because it refused to call a halt along the way although there
were ample opportunities to do so. 84
Chief Justice Taft, writing for the majority in Olmstead, took "the
reasonable view" that[O]ne who installs in his house a telephone instrument with connecting
wires intends to project his voice to those quite outside and that the wires
beyond his house and messages while passing over them are not within
the protection of the Fourth Amendment. Here those who intercepted the
projected voices were not in the house of either party to the conversa-

-

tion. 8 5

180. 816 U.S. at 118. See also id. at 122.
181. Comment, 57 COLum. L. 1,Ev. 1159, 1161 n.80 (1957) (discussion of lower
court Benanti opinon). See also Rosenzweig, The Law of Wire Tapping, 32 ConNELL
L.Q. 514, 547 (1947).
182. See DAsH 397-98.
183. "[I]f the conviction were actually brought about by the criminal use of an
intercepted communication before the trial, as in the Goldstein case, the conviction
would appear to be equally untenable." DAsH 398.
184. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S.
747, 762 (1952).
185. 277 U.S. at 466.
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Thus, Olmstead could have been readily distinguished in the two
wireless eavesdropping cases the Court has decided since: Goldman
v. United States'86 and On Lee v. United States.187 In Goldman, by
placing a detectaphone against the wall of a private office, federal
officers overheard conversations the petitioners did not intend to
project beyond their walls. Thus, petitioners did not "assume the
risk" that the messages might be intercepted. In On Lee, the words
were picked up via a "wired for sound" former acquaintance of petitioner working for the Narcotics Bureau who stood "within the constitutionally inviolate 'house' of a person." 1ss
Indeed, that Olmstead did not control the On Lee case is evidenced not only by dissenting Justices Burton and Frankfurter who
distinguished Olmstead:
[T]he fact that Chin Poy [the old acquaintance], without warrant and
without petitioner's consent, took with him the concealed radio transmitter
to which [Narcotics Bureau] agent Lee's receiving set was tuned ...
amounted to Chin Poy surreptitiously bringing Lee with him. 8 9

But it was also evidenced by the majority, per Mr. Justice Jackson,
who contended that petitioner's conviction should be affirmed even
"if he could persuade the Court to overturn... Olmstead,"
because:
Petitioner was talking confidentially and indiscreetly with one he trusted,
and he was overheard. This was due to aid from a transmitter and receiver to be sure, but with the same effect on his privacy as if agent Lee
had been eavesdropping outside an open window ....

It would be a

dubious service to the genuine liberties protected by the Fourth Amendment to .

..

liken eavesdropping on a conversation, with the conniv-

ance of one of the parties, to an unreasonable search or seizure. 190

Olmstead is hardly an insurmountable barrier in this area today
for another, more pervasive reason. While the Goldman majority

could still say that "no reasonable or logical distinction can be drawn
between what federal agents did in the present case and state officers did in the Olmstead case,"191 less than a year later the Court
drew-and underlined-just such a distinction in the famous ifileal detention case of McNabb v. United States.192 The McNabb
e of cases 193 amply demonstrates the Court's considerably greater
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

316 U.S. 129 (1942).
343 U.S. 747 (1952).
Id. at 767 (Burton, J., dissenting).
Id. at 766.
Id. at 753-54.

191. 316 U.S. at 135.
192. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
193. See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); Upshaw v. United States,
335 U.S. 410 (1948); Anderson v. United States, 318 U.S. 350 (1943). See generally
McCowmci, EVMENCE 246-51 (1954); MAcuraE, op. cit. supra note 162, at 155--166;
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power to formulate and apply standards of procedure and evidence
in federal tribunals than to review state convictions under the Federal Constitution.
Thus, even if Olmstead still stands, it can hardly stand in the way
of a Court bent on excluding the fruits of electronic eavesdropping
"in the exercise of its supervisory authority over the administration
4 To be sure, this approach
of criminal justice in the federal courts." 19
still would not prevent the use of state eavesdrop evidence in state
courts, but then, so long as Wolf is with us, neither would overruling
Olmstead.
It is true that the petitioner invoked McNabb to no avail in On
Lee, but the Court did not reject the principle- only its application
to the facts of the particular case:
Exclusion would have to be based on a policy which placed the penalizing
of Chin Boy's breach of confidence above ordinary canons of relevancy.
For On Lees statements to Chin Boy were admissions .... The normal
manner of proof would be to call Chin Foy and have him relate the conversation.... We should think a jury probably would find the testimony
of agent Lee to have more probative value than the word of Chin Boy.
*..* No good reason of public policy occurs to us why the Government
should be deprived of the benefit of On Lee's admissions because he
made them to a confidante of shady character. .

.

. However unwilling

we as individuals may be to approve conduct such as that of Chin Boy,
such disapproval must not be thought to justify a social policy of the
magnitude necessary to arbitrarily exclude otherwise relevant evidence. 195

It is not too difficult to see how or why the Court could deprive
federal authorities of the benefits of Goldman-type eavesdropping
Hogan and Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue, 47 Gzo.

L.J. 1 (1958).

194. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. at 841.
195. 843 U.S. at 756-57. Earlier in the opinion for the majority, Mr. Justice
Jackson did distinguish On Lee from McNabb on the ground that no specific federal
violation by federal officers occurred in the former case as did in the latter. Id. at 754.
But it has since become clear, if it had not been, that the administration of federal
justice may be fatally tainted by means other than specific violations of federal
statutes or rules. See the comments of the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, author of the McNabb opinion, in Communist Party of the United States
v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 851 U.S. 115, 124 (1956). Consider, too, the
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined by justices Douglas, Harlan and
Brennan, in Sherman v. United States, 856 U.S. 869, 880-82 (1958).
In any event, in his On Lee opinion Mr. Justice Jackson went on to recognize that
"rules of evidence . . . are formulated by the courts to some extent, as 'a question

of sound policy in the administration of the law,"' 848 U.S. at 755, but found "no
good reason of public policy" for exclusion in the particular case. See text at this
note.
Even aside from McNabb and its radiations, "recently [1948], Congress has confirmed the authority asserted by this Court ... to determine admissibility of evidence in federal criminal proceedings under the 'principles of the common law as
they may be interpreted . . .in the light of reason and experience.' Fed. Rules

Crim. Proc. 26." Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 76-77 (1958).
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after McNabb while it continues to admit the fruits of On Lee-type
breaches of confidence. It is still easier to see how or why the Court
could balk at the admission of evidence obtained by secreting a
microphone in petitioner's home or office, that is, "the case of physical entry, either by force . ..by unwilling submission to authority
* * * or without any express or implied consent' which Mr. Justice
Jackson explicitly left open in On Lee.'96 Indeed, Jackson himself
has elsewhere pointed the way to exclude such evidence under the
fourth amendment, even with Olmstead on the books. 97 At the
very least, such an invasion would seem to call into play the Court's
supervisory powers over the administration of federal justice.
Thus, Olmstead need not, and may not, prevent the Court from
excluding the fruits of all electronic eavesdropping except that conducted with the connivance of a party to the conversation. As already indicated, however, it seems this exception would still exist
196. 343 U.S. at 752-53.
197. In McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948), District of Columbia
police forced their way into a rooming house, proceeded to defendant's room, looked
through the transom and observed the commission of a crime, only to have the
evidence then seized thrown out of court as the product of a violation of the fourth
amendment. Looking through a transom is no more a "search" than listening at the
door. As Mr. Justice Jackson stressed in his concurring opinion, however, "the police
gained access to their peeking post" by illegal means, id. at- 458; "having forced an
entry without either a search warrant or an arrest warrant to justify it, the felonious
character of their entry . . .followed every step of their journey inside the house
and tainted its fruits with illegality." Id. at 459.
There seems little doubt that if, in Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954),
federal, rather than state, police had entered petitioner's home without a warrant to
install concealed microphones therein, the resulting evidence would have been barred.
Although the Court declined to exclude the evidence for the reasons set forth in
Wolf v. Colorado, Mr. Justice Jackson, who announced the judgment of the Court
and wrote a four-man opinion, observed that "few police measures have come to our
attention that more flagrantly, deliberately, and persistently violated the fundamental
principle declared by the Fourth Amendment as a restriction on the Federal Government." Id. at 132. See Paulsen, Safeguards in the Law of Search and Seizure, 52
Nw. U.L. REv. 65, 69 (1957).
Compare Silverman v. United States, 275 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1960). A majority
of the court sustained the validity of a search warrant based on eavesdropping by
means of a device inserted into a party wall, finding neither an unreasonable search
nor a violation of the Communications Act. For the forceful argument that since
Silverman involved the insertion of a spike at least half way into a party wall, a
trespass according to the law of party walls (unlike Goldman where a detectaphone
was merely placed against a wall) the police conduct constituted a violation of the
fourth amendment, see 27 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 735, 738--39 (1959) (discussion of
lower court opinion).
Dissenting Judge Washington argued that if the eavesdropping did not abridge
fourth amendment rights "it does violate . . . our fundamental concept of ordered

liberty, as embodied in the due process clauses." 275 F.2d at 179. However, neither
he nor the majority nor the case note considers the possibility that the warrant should
have been struck down in the "application of proper standards for the enforcement
of the federal criminal law in the federal courts." McNabb v. United States, 318
U.S. 332, 341 (1943).
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even if Brandeis, Holmes & Co. had prevailed in Olmstead, or if the
case were to be overruled.
D. What Was Won in the Nardone Cases?
I have asked, what was lost in Olmstead? Those who carry on the
brave fight that Justices Brandeis and Holmes waged unsuccessfully
in Olmstead might well point to the dismal lack of enforcement under section 605 and retort, what was won in the Nardone cases?
I would hate to have to argue that very much was won, but I do
not think I need to. I do not claim that section 605 has accomplished
much; I simply maintain that the fourth amendment would not have
achieved any more. That there has been a notable failure to comply
with the requirements of section 605 cannot be denied. But is there
any reason to think that a fourth amendment ban would have fared
any better? Is there not ample evidence to support the observation
that "no other constitutional guarantee is so openly flouted with so
little public outcry"?' 98
(1) The "troublesome"wording of section 605
Those who still debate the Olmstead case may say that if the
Constitution, rather than the Federal Communications Act, prohibited tapping, at least the troublesome wording of section 605
would be gone- and with it the strained argument that lawenforcement tapping is legal so long as there is no divulgence outside the Department of Justice.'99 I wonder whether the ingeniousness of government lawyers can be so easily suppressed. I doubt that
those who managed to contrive the present tortured rationalization
for law enforcement tapping would be stopped cold by the language
of the fourth amendment.
In any event, my doubts about the efficacy of substituting other
language for section 605 have deeper roots. It is quite evident, I
think, that the statutory argument now put forth by the Department
of Justice is merely a symptom-and that the illness will not be
eradicated simply by resorting to the language of the fourth amendment. Public indifference toward, if not approval of, extra-legal tapping in "appealing cases" such as "offenses endangering the safety
of the nation or the lives of human beings"200 will remain. So will
the insistence by law enforcement officials that their tapping "is a
198. Comment, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 493 (1952). See, e.g., Foote, Safeguards in the
Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 16, 28-29, 34-36, 43-44 (1957); Hall, Police and
Law in a Democratic Society, 28 IND. L.J. 134, 152-60 (1953); Note, 100 U. PA.
L. REv. 1182, 1195, 1197-98, 1201-02, 1205-06 (1952). See also note 10 supra.
199. See e.g., Williams, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Defense

Counsel's View, 44 Mnw. L. REV. 855--62 (1960).
200. Hoover, Rejoinder, 58 YALE L.J. 422, 423 (1949).
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necessary concomitant of our present-day pursuit of spies, saboteurs,
and other subversives" and "no worse . . . than is the use of in-

formants, decoys, dictaphones, peeping, and the likehave been accepted practices for many years."

20 1

all of which

As will the extra-

ordinary difficulties of establishing not only that defendant's phone
was tapped at all, and by public officers, but, even if this hurdle can
be cleared, that the evidence finally proferred in court was obtained
primarily from such tapping rather than from independent sources
- problems of proof which render the present protection against
tapping largely illusory."'
It is interesting to note that a 1931 provision in the F.B.I. manual
authorizing tapping when "prior authorization of the Director of
the Bureau has been secured" was not superseded until March 18,
1940,203 more than two years after the Court in the first Nardone

case had interpreted section 605 to "include within its sweep federal
officers as well as others"2 04 and more than three months afer the
second Nardone case had banned "leads" as well. This delay in comphliance took place although the contention had not yet been made
that section 605 puts no restraint on interception alone nor on interception plus intra-govermmental divulgence.
Indeed the very release by Attorney General Jackson disclosing
this change in F.B.I. policy, issued as late as 1941, contained the
concessions that the Nardone cases "have in effect overruled the
contentions of the Department that it might use wiretapping in its
crime suppression" and that "under the existing state of the law
and decisions" even tapping in a limited class of cases . . . cannot
205
be done unless Congress sees fit to modify the existing statutes."
The Supreme Court was not presented with another wiretapping
case until more than two years later-nor did it then, nor has it
yet-supported the current Department of Justice interpretation of
section 605.206 Nevertheless, in May of 1940, a short two months
201. Rogers, The Case for Wire Tapping, 63 YALE L.J. 792, 793-94 (1954). To
the same effect is Brownell, supra note 146, at 202, 204-015.
202. See note 166 supra.
208. Statement of Attorney General Jackson, Mar. 18, 1940, reprinted in full in

86

CONG. REC. App. 1471-2 (1940).
204. 802 U.S. at 884.
205. 86 CONG. REc. APP. 1472 (1940).

206. According to Donnelly, Comments and Caveats on the Wire Tapping Controversy, 63 YA.3 L.J. 799, 801 (1954), no judicial support for the Department's position appeared until Judge Reeves' dictum in United States v. Coplon, 91 F. Supp. 867,
871 (D.D.C. 1950), rev'd on other grounds, 191 F. 2nd 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951) that
section 605 "does not make wire-tapping an offense, but the interception and disclosure ... constitute the crime." In the New York Coplon case, both Judge Ryan,
88 F. Supp. 921, 925 (S.D. N.Y. 1950), and Chief Judge Learned Hand, speaking
for a unanimous Second Circuit, 185 F.2d 629, 636 (1950), indicated that interception without more was unlawful.
While the statutory language is obviously susceptible of the interpretation that
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after these concessions were made, F.B.I. tapping resumed.117
Although Attorney General Jackson told Chairman Summers of
the House Committee on the Judiciary in March of 1941 that
"there is no Federal statute that prohibits or punishes wiretapping
alone,"2 8 only a month earlier he wrote to Sumners:
In the interests of national defense, as well as of internal safety, the interception of communications should, in a limited degree, be permitted to
Federal law-enforcement officers. .20 9. . I recommend legislation to carry

out the foregoing recommendation.

Jackson, it turns out, was going through the motions of asking
Congress for legislation to authorize what the Department was
already doing. Tapping had resumed in May of 1940 pursuant to
a confidential presidential directive authorizing the Attorney General to approve wiretapping "when necessary in situations involving
the defense of the nation. 210 Can it be seriously contended that in
the face of such a directive a more precisely worded statute, or even
a fourth211amendment ban, would have succeeded where section 605
failed?
only an interception and divulgence constitute the offense, it seemed fairly clear from
the language in the second Nardone case, 808 U.S. at 840-41, if not from the
language in the first, 802 U.S. at 882, that either would suffice. See Kamisar, Wolf
and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and Federal Courts, 48
MmNN. L. REv. 1083, 1111 n.92 (1959). It is true that the Court appeared to reserve
this question in Benanti, 855 U.S. at 100 n.5, "because both an interception and
a divulgence are present in this case," but while state officers alone "intercepted"
the communications and federal authorities alone "divulged" its existence, the Court
treated "divulgence" alone as a violation of section 605, id. at 100, 102. if the Court
reads "no person... shall intercept any communication and divulge the . ..
existence" to mean "intercept or divulge," in order to find "divulgence" alone a
violation, how can it avoid reading the same statutory language in the disjunctive to
find "interception" alone a violation?
In any event, the Justice Department must also clear a second - and higher hurdle, that is, the use and dissemination of wiretap information still does not constitute a violation so long as it takes place within the Department. Not only does the
view that divulgence by one government agent to another does not really constitute
"divulgence" seem to "defy the plain words of the statute and the decisions of the
Supreme Court," Williams, supra note 199, at 860, but, as close readers of section 605
have pointed out, it also ignores the provision which bans the "use" of intercepted
communications "or any information therein contained," for any one's benefit. See
MoRwELND, MoDm
Car.m,. PnocxnFC 144-45 (1959); Donnelly, supra at 801;
Williams, supra at 859-60.
207. See text at note 210 infra.
208. Hearings on H.R. 2266 and H.R. 8099 Before Subcommittee No. 1 of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1941).
209. Id. at 17. (Emphasis added.)
210. So described in Hoover, supra note 200, at 423. See also Rogers, supra note
201, at 795 & n.15. This memorandum has never been made public and Alan
Barth reports that "attempts to obtain it from the Department of Justice have been
of no avail." BAnTHa, Tim LoYALTY OF Fram MEN 172 n.16 (1951). See also Helfeld,
A Study of Justice Department Policies on Wire Tapping, 9 LAw Gum REv. 57,
60 n.84 (1949).
211. If federal officers resumed tapping in 1941 without any such directive, as
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The February 1941 testimony of Judge Holtzoff, then a special
assistant to the Attorney General, in favor of proposals to permit
limited tapping is also illuminating:
[W]e want this authority not only in cases of sabotage. . . . We need it,
also, for some of the crimes which do not affect national defense. For
instance, in cases of kidnaping, tapping the telephone wires of the victim's
home is one of the necessary things in every kidnaping investigation, and
without permission to do so, if a kidnaping should occur in the future,
the Department would be greatly handicapped . . . and I venture to say
2 12
that such permission should exist in narcotic cases.

A month later, however, Holtzoff's superior disclosed that the Department was tapping in kidnapping cases:
A short time ago a small child was kidnaped in California. There was
reason to expect that demands would be made upon the parents by telephone. If the voice making such a call were recorded . . . it might be
decisive in saving the life of the child, or in convicting the kidnaper, and
it might be equally decisive in clearing an innocent person . . ..
Of course, I directed Mr. Hoover to put a recording device on that
213
line.

Can it be seriously contended that if the statutory language more
precisely prohibited "interceptions" alone, or even if tapping were
banned by the fourth amendment, Jackson would have told Hoover
to go twiddle his thumbs? Can it even be seriously contended that
if at the time the fourth amendment had been construed to prohibit
tapping under such circumstances the Attorney General would have
been at all bashful about telling the chairman of a House committee
that, of course, he directed Mr. Hoover to tap?
Nor is it amiss to note that, when Francis Biddle held his first
suggested in Helfeld, supra note 210, they would appear to be even less likely to be
affected by a constitutional or tighter statutory ban.
212. Hearings, supra note 208, at 7. (Emphasis added.)
213. Letter from Attorney General Jackson to Chairman Sumners, March 19, 1941,
id. at 19. At the time and for many years thereafter, on the authority of Judge
Learned Hand's opinion in United States v. Polakoff, 112 F.2d 888 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 311 U.S. 653 (1940), it was thought that an interception of a phone conversation could not be made even with the consent of one of the parties to the call. It is
interesting to note that the author of one of the most powerful articles against wiretapping ever written nevertheless contended that law enforcement officials should
have the right to tap in such a situation. "The risk to which the nonconsenting party
is subjected is not really a wiretapping risk," he observed, "but the risk of betrayal
by the other party who acquiesced in the tap, a risk inherent in any form of communication with him." Schwartz, On Current Proposals to Legalize Wire Tapping, 103
U. PA. L. REv. 157, 166-67 (1954). See also Bernstein, The Fruit of the Poisonous
Tree, 37 Ir. L. Bzv. 99, 109-14 (1942). This view prevailed in Rathbun v. United
States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957). The police can undoubtedly obtain the consent of the
parents of the kidnapped child to install a tap in most cases, but there have been and
there will continue to be situations where, although the parents have notified the
authorities of the crime, because of the kidnapper's threats or otherwise they do not
want the police to take any action at all until the child is returned safe and sound.

1960]

WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING

press conference as Attorney General in October of 1941, he is reported to have told the assembled reporters:
[T]he stand of the Department of Justice would be, as indeed it had been
for some time, to authorize wire tapping in espionage, sabotage and kidnapping cases, where the circumstances warranted ...
[H]e understood that former Attorney General Jackson had relaxed the
general ban in the Department of Justice against tapping wires in order
to deal effectively with espionage and he thought this leeway might be
extended to extortion cases.214

Can it be seriously contended that Attorneys General -and Biddle is hardly the worst one we have ever had-who openly contemplate building on extra-legal precedents, and who unashamedly
play fast and loose with statutory language and Supreme Court
decisions, would be stymied, albeit more troubled, by tighter statutory wording or even by a fourth amendment ban?
(4) Section 605, the fourth amendment, and possible legislative
encroachment
Perhaps the most appealing reason for relying on the fourth
amendment rather than on the Communications Act is that such a
course would bring an end to attempted legislative encroachment upon present proAct, but it
hibitions. Congress can amend or repeal the Communications
215
cannot amend or repeal the fourth amendment.

The short answer is that if a protection is illusory it does not really
make too much difference on what paper it is written. But too often
short answers are not full ones. To say that law enforcement officers
do not take the tapping prohibition very seriously is hardly to say
21
that either they or the public are completely uninfluenced by it. 1
The ban has some effect on their actions, and there is certainly something to be said for placing it beyond the reach of Congress.
However, those who look to the fourth amendment for permanent
protection cannot be sure of even this much. The substantive protection furnished by the fourth amendment may not be the subject
of legislation, but what about the exclusionary rule which implements it?
In Wolf v. Colorado, Mr. Justice Frankfurter left this question
214. Quoted in Hoover, supra note 200, at 423. (Emphasis added.)
215. See Williams, supra note 199, at 862.
216. For the view that "the law" can modify and create public attitudes and
affect police practice, and for illustrations of how it has, see Hall, supra note 198, at
161; Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HAnv. L. REv. 193,
208-09 (1952). See also Paulsen, supra note 197, at 67 (rules restricting police
"have a symbolic value of highest importance").
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open; 217 only two members of the Court flatly rejected "any intimation that Congress could validly enact legislation permitting the introduction in federal courts of evidence seized in violation of the
2 18
In Irvine v. California,'9 Mr. Justice JackFourth Amendment."1

son, in a four-man opinion, looked back on Wolf as a case which
"declined to make the subsidiary procedural and evidentiary doctrines developed by the federal courts limitations on the states";220
neither the concurring Justice nor the four dissenters explicitly challenged this characterization of the federal exclusionary rule. Indeed,
Mr. Justice Black, one of the Irvine dissenters, had earlier viewed
the exclusionary rule as "a judicially created rule of evidence which
Congress might negate." 2 1
I do not say that if and when the occasion arises the Court will
hold that Congress can negate the exclusionary rule. But I cannot
forget there is at least a significant possibility that it might so
hold.222 And this in turn raises the possibility that if the Constitution, rather than a statute, frustrated would-be law enforcement
tappers, more extreme measures might be advocated. That is to
say, sufficient pressure mounted to amend a statutory ban against
tapping in, for example, espionage or narcotic or labor racketeering
might sweep up search and seizure as well and lead to a relaxation
of the federal exclusionary rule for all fourth amendment violations
in quch cases.223 In viewing the fourth amendment as a much more
217. While Mr. Justice Black, concurring in Wolf, agreed "with what appears to
be a plain implication of the Court's opinion that the federal exclusionary rule is not
a command of the Fourth Amendment but is a judicially created rule of evidence
which Congress might negate," 338 U.S. at 39-40, the implication of Frankffurter's
opinion for the majority was anything but plain. See the discussion in Note, 50
CoLum. L. REv. 864, 366-67 (1950).
218. Mr. Justice Rutledge, dissenting, joined by Mr. Justice Murphy, 388 U.S. at 48.
219. 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
220. Id. at 132. (Emphasis added.)
221. See note 217 supra.
222. Some would put it a good deal more strongly. See, e.g., Waite, Judges and
the Crime Burden, 54 MicH. L. REv. 169, 171-72 (1955). Professor Waite relies
heavily on the fact that many state courts do not exclude illegal evidence despite
the close similarity between state and federal constitutional provisions banning
unreasonable searches and seizures.
223. Consider the Michigan experience. Its Supreme Court adopted the federal
exclusionary rule, but by a 1936 constitutional amendment -seizures of dangerous
weapons or things were excepted and by further amendment in 1952 narcotic drugs
were also excepted. MicH. CONST. art. 2, § 10. Consider also the Maryland experience.
A 1928 Act made an exception to the common law rule of admissibility in misdemeanor cases, but subsequent amendments have made prosecutions for unlawfully
carrying a concealed weapon, for violations of health-narcotic drugs laws and, in
certain counties, for violations of various gambling laws exceptions to the exception.
MD. ANN. CoDE, art. 35, § 5; art. 27, § 299 (1957). The history of the Maryland
legislation in this field is traced in Salzburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954), which
upheld the state's checkered pattern against contentions that it violated the equal
protection clause. At present there is reported to be "marked pressure" in California
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majestic battlefield than section 605 on which to pitch a stand
against wiretapping, liberals may make the mistake of overlooking
the fact that a good deal more may ride on the outcome of such a
battle.
E. Wiretapping-Eavesdropping,Other Invasionsof Privacy,and "the
Man in the Street"
Whatever the historical reasons, and a major one may well be the
long-held habit of "leaving it to the judges," 224 the current indifference of the American people to invasions of civil liberties other than
wiretapping- for example, illegal detention, wrongful arrest, unreasonable search and seizure- makes me most reluctant to bank
too much on public opinion in these areas. Talk long and loud as
you like about police mistreatment of a "squalid huckster of bad
liquor paving the way for government suppression of political liberties 225 or the knock on the door of an opium smoking den being the
knock on Everyman's door.226 I am sure that the man on the street
-and a good many off it-are quite unimpressed.
Who cares what is happening today to the subversives, the narcotics peddlers, the labor racketeers or even the gamblers -or what
is about to happen to them tomorrow? For too many the reassuring thought is that so far at least our liberties, that is, the liberties of decent citizens, have been in no way impaired. I do not
know whether it is true that "clever men . . . are impressed by
their differences from their fellows" while "wise men are conscious
of their resemblance to them."22 But if it is true, I am afraid we are
suffering from an acute shortage of wisdom. I do not know whether,
as has been said, "no society can long survive if each of its members
in the last analysis calls himself T and regards all others as a kind
of inanimate 'They.'"' 2 But I do know that many members of our
society have been doing just that for quite some time.
The wiretapping-eavesdropping problem, however, is different,
quite different. Here, at least, law enforcement officers have discovered that they must reckon with a public opinion nurtured by
numerous and extensive legislative debates and hearings, front-page
bugging or tapping scandals, and frequent newspaper editorial comto relax the rule of exclusion in narcotic cases. MAGuIm, EVIDENCE or GUILT 171
n.1O (1959).
224. See JACKSoN, T3HE SUPREME COURT i THE AmmuOA SYSTEMri or COVEENmENr 82 (1955).
225. See United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202, 203 (2d Cir. 1926) (per
L. Hand).
226. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 17 (1948).
227. TAwNEY, EQuA=rr 81 (4th ed. 1952).
228. Nelson, The Future of Illusions, in 2 MAr IN CoNTEwon
y SocIETY 959,
976 (Columbia Univ. ed. 1956).
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ment. 2 9 They must reckon with a public opinion which on this aspect of civil liberties probably more than any other, if still not fully
enlightened, is most alert and most vigorous.
It is well known that wiretapping is not restricted to "not very
nice people" and "sordid little cases"; 2 30 it touches all kinds, the
reputable, the rich and the powerful as well as the notorious, the
poor and the miserable, and it affects many, many persons.
A 1940 congressional investigation disclosed taps on such prominent persons as J. P. Morgan and John W. Davis and on such prominent corporations as the Guaranty Trust Company and the Soviet
Amtorg Trading Company.23 ' It was learned in 1955 that "captives"
of the 55th street "wiretap factory," capable of intercepting conversations over 100,000 phones, were "large law firms; gigantic business
and financial houses; major publishing companies; aristocratic hotels
patronized by the wealthy and the famous . . . and other subscribers who daily on the telephone made decisions, plans, and compacts, the knowledge of which was priceless to competing or adversary interests."2 32 In the same year, the District Attorney of
Philadelphia released to the press transcripts of telephone taps he
had made on the lines of Teamster organizers.2 33 More recently, a
New York joint legislative committee revealed electronic spying by
the New York Transit Authority on the23 4Motormen's Benevolent Association during the 1957 transit strike.
In 1948 various offices in the State Building in Los Angeles, including the attorney general's office, were tapped and/or bugged at
the direction of an assistant attorney general.233 A bar committee
was told the same year by a former secretary to Mayor Jimmy
Walker that "when municipal investigations are in progress, 'every229. As Professor Westin has observed, "even Daddy Warbucks in the comic
strip 'Little Orphan Annie' learned to his anger that agents of 'The Syndicate' were
tapping his calls." Westin, Wiretapping: The Quiet Revolution, 29 ComrnnnNmTn 333,

334 (1960).
Most of the incidents cited at notes 231-41 infra were featured by the mass media.
For a survey of editorial opinion on the subject up to 1952, much of which condemned F.B.I. tactics revealed in the Coplon trials and sharply criticized the announced policy of the Attorney General to permit law enforcement tapping on his sayso, see Westin, The Wire-Tapping Problem: An Analysis and a Legislative Proposal,
52 CoLU . L. lEv. 165, 189-92 (1952). "While many newspapers desired a complete
ban on wire tapping, the majority favored a system of guarded permission in limited
areas, with tight judicial control and effective sanctions against officials who misused
their wire-tapping powers." Id. at 191.
230. The phrases are those of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in United States
v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 68-69 (1950).

231.

DAsH 31.

232. Id. at 86.
233. Westin, Wiretapping: The Quiet Revolution, 29 CoamNerAny 333 (1960).

234.

DAsH 96-97.

235. Id. at 204.
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body is wiretapped."" 2 36 In 1955 the phone of Mayor Morrison of

New Orleans was tapped at a time when he was a candidate for
governor. 237 A Senate Committee learned in 1951 that a District of
Columbia police lieutenant had tapped a United States Senator and
were being made
officials of a major airline at a time when efforts
238
to arrange a merger between major airlines.

The Mayor of New York hired a private investigator in 1945 to
tap the phones of certain UNRRA employees suspected of dishonesty.239 "There are charges that wiretapping may be an essential part
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's population-wide 'loyalty'
probe. And recently complaints have been made that telephones of
United Nations delegates and employees are under surveillance, as
well as the telephones of foreign embassies, legations, and missions
in the United States." 240 Apparently not even the Supreme Court of
the United States and the White House have escaped unscathed.24 '
It is much easier to see in a wiretapping case than in one involving
search and seizure why "the progress is too easy from police action
unscrutinized by judicial authorization to the police state." 242 It is
also much easier to grasp the message that the "rights of everyone
are immediately imperilled when the rights of even the outcast, the
disdained, and the powerless, are trampled over with impunity. 243
ForWhen a telephone is monitored, all who use it are overheard. These
may include persons who are not under suspicion at all-guests and
servants in the home of the suspect as well as anyone who happens to be
on the other end of the line. They may include conversations which have
nothing whatever to do with the alleged crime under investigation. They
may entail the breach of confidential relations which the law has always
regarded as privileged. In monitoring telephones in the Coplon case, the
FBI recorded talks between the defendant and her mother, a quarrel
between a husband and wife who had no connection with the case, and
even conferences between the defendant and her lawyer. It learned, incidentally, about an affair, altogether unrelated244to espionage, between
Miss Coplon and a Justice Department attorney.

Nor is this the end of the matter:
Plainclothesmen also set up wiretap "dragnets" in areas where there are
236. Id. at 383.

Id. at 136-37.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 32-83.
Westin, The Wire-Tapping Problem: An Analysis and a Legislative Proposal,
52 CoLum. L. REv. 165, 167 (1952).
241. DAm 29 (both incidents seem to have taken place about 1935).
242. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S.
56, 82 (1950).
243. Worthington v. United States, 166 F.2d 557, 568 (6th Cir. 1948).
237.
238.
239.
240.

244.

BAMTU

THE LOYALTY OF FsE MEN 173 (1951).
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large concentrations of people. One such area contains a bus stop, a subway station, and a railroad station. Another favorite spot is the bus stop
from which the buses leave the race track. Here, it is an easy matter to
and then tap
locate the terminal boxes for the various public telephones
245
these lines for a short period of time each day.

Only this year, a master of the subject reported that "a civil liberties revolt has taken place in America over wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping": 248
Since 1953, eighteen states have had legislative debates over wire tapping
control laws. Of these, four have joined New York in placing official wire
tapping under court-supervised warrant procedures and outlawing private
interceptions. Two states have banned all wire tapping, whether done by
private detectives or the state police. Five states have gone beyond telephone eavesdropping and enacted controls on all types of electronic
monitoring -by radio, microphone, or electric beam. Three states have
had judicial rulings which declared wire tapping to be illegal under existing laws and have excluded wiretap evidence from state trials. One
state (Texas) passed a new law excluding wiretap evidence from state
trials. 247
Before 1953, as surveys unequivocally showed, community sentiment ran
in favor of official taps at official discretion, not against them. Today, in
the states which have enacted controls and in many others where legislation is under consideration, the trend of community sentiment is in the
other direction. The most potent method of dealing with recalcitrant
police officials is surveillance by special legislative committees (like the
Forbes Committee in New Jersey, the Savarese Committee in New York,
and the Regan Committee in California) which have been active since
take on law en1958 and which possess the necessary political power to
248
forcement officials who disregard their legal limitations.

Nor have wiretapping opponents fared badly at the national level.
It is well to remember that through hot war and through cold war
law enforcement officials have sought in vain to amend section 605.
They have insisted that they needed such legislation to deal with
treason, espionage and sabotage; they have told Congress much
about Japanese, German, and Russian spies. They have dwelt at even
greater length on kidnappers of little children. Over twenty years
and over fifty bills2 49 later - they have nothing whatever to
show for their efforts.
The liberals may have lost a battle in Olmstead, but by carrying
the fight to the court of public opinion I think they are winning
245. DASH 70.

246.
247.
248.
249.

Westin, Wiretapping: The Quiet Revolution, 29 Com2=rTmry 333 (1960).
ibid.
Id. at 337.
See the Legislative Reference Service compilation of the legislative history

of wiretapping-eavesdropping bills introduced during 1919-1959, 1959 Hearings pt.
4, at 781-1031 (1959) (app. to pt. 8).
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much more. They are winning in an arena where they must winwhere they have not won nearly often enough. If those who strive
to restrict police practices on grounds of "policy and common
sense "250 cannot win on the wiretapping issue, where can they?
I do not predict that the civil liberties, labor and other groups
who have successfully resisted any relaxing of section 605 will do as
well against the next fifty proposals as they have against the last
fifty. I do not even say they should. I only say that if talk of the
"free society," 2 ' "the dignity of man," 252 avoidance of "an atmosphere of anxiety" 253 or "the preservation of an atmosphere of freedom and respect for individuality" 254 is ever to reach the man in the
street above the clamor for weapons to deal with "treason, espionage, sabotage and the kidnapping of little children," 255 to wage
war against "the criminal cartels, 2 56 to guard "the safety of our
Nation,"257 wiretapping is the battlefield. The irony of it is that a
contrary ruling in Olmstead might well have deprived us of this
battle.
CONCLUSION

We know a good deal more about wiretapping-eavesdropping
practices than we did before Samuel Dash and his colleagues wrote
The Eavesdroppers.But we do not know all we would like to know.
I doubt that we ever will.
Even if somehow, some way, the many "facts" were to stand still
long enough for us to get at them, 58 I am not at all sure what we
250. "[W]e shall have to recognize that the problems [of criminal procedure] are,
in the larger part, not those of the limits of constitutional power but of policy and
common sense." Allen, Law and the Future: Criminal Law and Administration, 51
Nw. U.L. REv. 207, 215 (1956).

251. Donnelly, supra note 206, at 806.
252. Statement of Professor Helen Silving, 1958 Hearings pt. 3, at 678.
253. Id. at 682.
254. Schwartz, On Current Proposals to Legalize Wire Tapping, 103 U. PA. L.
Ruv. 157, 158 (1954).
255. Hoover, Department of Justice Press Release, Jan. 15, 1950, quoted in Rogers,
The Case for Wiretapping, 63 YA. L.J. 792, 796-97 (1954).
256. PAmauR, PoucE 104 (Wilson ed. 1957).
257. Congressman (now Senator) Kenneth B. Keating, Hearings on H.R?. 408,
477, 3552, and 5149 Before Subcommittee No. 8 of the House Committee on the
Judiciary,83d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1953).
258. Although THE EAvRoPPERS was published in late 1959, much of it deals
with the situation prior to 1958. See, e.g., DAsH 79, 128, 231, 276. A report by Professor Westin published in April of this year indicates that in the meantime a number
of significant changes have taken- or at least are taking- place. For example:
[PIrivate tapping has without question been pushed back from the high tide of
the early 1950's. A good many of the nation's leading private tappers have been
tried and convicted ....
Undoubtedly, private tapping continues in the major cities.... But the old,
virtually open flaunting of private wire tapping (including ads in the yellow
pages . . ) is passing away. Moreover, the former camaraderie between the
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would have then achieved. Surely, the whole-truth-and-nothing-butthe-truth about this ever so complicated business would not point
plainly to a single resolution of the fundamental issues posed.
Rather, I think that here, as elsewhere, "when the last factual survey
has been completed and the last questionnaire has been returned
and tabulated, we shall still have to decide" and to do so we shall
still have to resort to "the natural process of compromise
by which
259
such issues are actually settled in a peaceful society."
Here, as elsewhere, I think, sooner or later we will, and we should,
remove some "keep-off-the-grass" signs and "pave the paths cut by
trespassing feet.', 26 o Indeed, the best measure for really keeping the
police off the grass at many points may well be taking down the
barriers at others. "[I]f the rules make sense in the light of a policeman's task, we will be in a stronger position to insist that he obey
them." 26 1 And if an absolutely-unconditionally-positively-no-tapping sign makes little or no sense to a policeman I really cannot say
I blame him.
The observation has been made that "a government which acts
genuinely in the interests of the general public runs a risk of being
thought by each section to be perversely ignoring the interests of
that section." 262 Thus, I have a hope, as well as an expectation, that

fewer signs will be removed than law enforcement officials desire,
yet more than many opponents of wiretapping would-ike to see.
police and private-eye wire tapping experts in many cities
by the new climate of public opinion.
Westin, Wiretapping: The Quiet Revolution, 29 Coamra-rARY
259. FuLnnP My Pmosopny OF LAw 113, 118-19 (1941).
in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U.L. Rlv. 16, 45 (1957).
260. Fuller, Freedom- A Suggested Analysis, 68 Hnv.

(1955).
261. Paulsen, supra note 197, at 66.
262. Russ=., AurTronrrv AND = 1smrvaL 41 (1949).

has been shattered
333, 835-36 (1960).
Cf. Foote, Safeguards
L. tlEv. 1305, 1325

